Related papers: Statistical Equilibrium of Optimistic Beliefs

We propose a new dynamics for equilibrium selection of finite player discrete strategy games. The dynamics is motivated by optimal transportation, and models individual players' myopicity, greedy and uncertainty when making decisions. The…

Empirically, many strategic settings are characterized by stable outcomes in which players' decisions are publicly observed, yet no player takes the opportunity to deviate. To analyze such situations in the presence of incomplete…

Observable games are game situations that reach one of possibly many Nash equilibria. Before an instance of the game starts, an external observer does not know, a priori, what is the exact profile of actions that will occur; thus, he…

This paper studies the rationalization and identification of binary games where players have correlated private types. Allowing for correlation is crucial in global games and in models with social interactions as it represents correlated…

Starting from a heuristic learning scheme for N-person games, we derive a new class of continuous-time learning dynamics consisting of a replicator-like drift adjusted by a penalty term that renders the boundary of the game's strategy space…

Nash equilibrium is a key concept in game theory fundamental for elucidating the equilibrium state of strategic interactions, finding applications in diverse fields such as economics, political science, and biology. However, the Nash…

We study pure-strategy Nash equilibria in multi-player concurrent deterministic games, for a variety of preference relations. We provide a novel construction, called the suspect game, which transforms a multi-player concurrent game into a…

In this article we evaluate the statistical evidence that a population of students learn about the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the centipede game via repeated play of the game. This is done by formulating a model in which a…

There has been significant recent interest in leader-follower security games, where the leader dominates the decision process with the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) strategy. However, such a leader-follower scheme may become invalid in…

The paper studies one-shot two-player games with non-Bayesian uncertainty. The players have an attitude that ranges from optimism to pessimism in the face of uncertainty. Given the attitudes, each player forms a belief about the set of…

We study the foundations of empirical equilibrium, a refinement of Nash equilibrium that is based on a non-parametric characterization of empirical distributions of behavior in games (Velez and Brown,2020b arXiv:1907.12408). The refinement…

Decentralized team problems where players have asymmetric information about the state of the underlying stochastic system have been actively studied, but \emph{games} between such teams are less understood. We consider a general model of…

A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…

We consider a 3-player game in the normal form, in which each player has two actions. We assume that the game is symmetric and repeated infinitely many times. At each stage players make their choices knowing only the average payoffs from…

We consider a class of interdependent security games on networks where each node chooses a personal level of security investment. The attack probability experienced by a node is a function of her own investment and the investment by her…

We consider simple stochastic games with terminal-node rewards and multiple players, who have differing perceptions of risk. Specifically, we study risk-sensitive equilibria (RSEs), where no player can improve their perceived reward --…

We consider a finite horizon repeated game with $N$ selfish players who observe their types privately and take actions, which are publicly observed. Their actions and types jointly determine their instantaneous rewards. In each period,…

This paper characterizes optimal classification when individuals adjust their behavior in response to the classification rule. We model the interaction between a designer and a population as a Stackelberg game: the designer selects a…

Conventional game theory assumes that players are perfectly rational. In a realistic situation, however, players are rarely perfectly rational. This bounded rationality is one of the main reasons why the predictions of Nash equilibrium in…

The concept of Nash equilibrium in behavioral strategies (NashEBS) was formulated By Nash~\cite{Nash (1951)} for an extensive-form game through global rationality of nonconvex payoff functions. Kuhn's payoff equivalence theorem resolves the…