Related papers: Mechanism Design in Max-Flows
We study the mechanism design problem of allocating a set of indivisible items without monetary transfers. Despite the vast literature on this very standard model, it still remains unclear how do truthful mechanisms look like. We focus on…
We study a fair division problem with indivisible items, namely the computation of maximin share allocations. Given a set of $n$ players, the maximin share of a single player is the best she can guarantee to herself, if she would partition…
This paper studies an incentive structure for cooperation and its stability in peer-assisted services when there exist multiple content providers, using a coalition game theoretic approach. We first consider a generalized coalition…
This paper studies an incentive structure for cooperation and its stability in peer-assisted services when there exist multiple content providers, using a coalition game theoretic approach. We first consider a generalized coalition…
Policy makers focus on stable strategies as the ones adopted by rational players. If there are many such solutions an important question is how to select amongst them. We study this question for the Multicommodity Flow Coalition Game, used…
We study a game-theoretic variant of the maximum circulation problem. In a flow allocation game, we are given a directed flow network. Each node is a rational agent and can strategically allocate any incoming flow to the outgoing edges.…
Motivated by the markets operating on fast time scales, we present a framework for online coalitional games with time-varying coalitional values and propose real-time payoff distribution mechanisms. Specifically, we design two online…
Mechanism design is addressed in the context of fair allocations of indivisible goods with monetary compensation. Motivated by a real-world social choice problem, mechanisms with verification are considered in a setting where (i) agents'…
Designing fair compensation mechanisms for demand response (DR) is challenging. This paper models the problem in a game theoretic setting and designs a payment distribution mechanism based on the Shapley Value. As exact computation of the…
In many multi-agent settings, participants can form teams to achieve collective outcomes that may far surpass their individual capabilities. Measuring the relative contributions of agents and allocating them shares of the reward that…
We formulate and study the algorithmic mechanism design problem for a general class of resource allocation settings, where the center redistributes the private resources brought by individuals. Money transfer is forbidden. Distinct from the…
A rapidly growing literature on lying in behavioral economics and psychology shows that individuals often do not lie even when lying maximizes their utility. In this work, we attempt to incorporate these findings into the theory of…
We consider game-theoretically secure distributed protocols for coalition games that approximate the Shapley value with small multiplicative error. Since all known existing approximation algorithms for the Shapley value are randomized, it…
The latest developments in AI focus on agentic systems where artificial and human agents cooperate to realize global goals. An example is collaborative learning, which aims to train a global model based on data from individual agents. A…
We propose a generic mechanism for incentivizing behavior in an arbitrary finite game using payments. Doing so is trivial if the mechanism is allowed to observe all actions taken in the game, as this allows it to simply punish those agents…
In this paper, we consider zero-sum repeated games in which the maximizer is restricted to strategies requiring no more than a limited amount of randomness. Particularly, we analyze the maxmin payoff of the maximizer in two models: the…
We investigate mechanism design without payments when agents have different types of preferences. Contrary to most settings in the literature where agents have the same preference, e.g. in the facility location games all agents would like…
Data-management-as-a-service systems are increasingly being used in collaborative settings, where multiple users access common datasets. Cloud providers have the choice to implement various optimizations, such as indexing or materialized…
Coalition formation is often modeled as a static equilibrium problem, neglecting the dynamic processes governing how agents self-organize. This paper proposes a dynamic split-and-merge framework that balances two conflicting economic…
Recent work has constructed economic mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private. In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from the truthfulness; it is not incorporated in players' utility functions (and doing so…