Related papers: When Should a Principal Delegate to an Agent in Se…

I study how organizations assign tasks to identify the best candidate to promote among a pool of workers. Task allocation and workers' motivation interact through the organization's promotion decisions. The organization designs the workers'…

We consider the information design problem in spatial resource competition settings. Agents gather at a location deciding whether to move to another location for possibly higher level of resources, and the utility each agent gets by moving…

We study hidden-action principal-agent problems with multiple agents. These are problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme in order to incentivize some agents to take costly, unobservable actions that lead…

We study a screening problem in which an agent privately observes a set of feasible technologies and can strategically disclose only a subset to the principal. The principal then takes an action whose payoff consequences for both players…

Incentives are more likely to elicit desired outcomes when they are designed based on accurate models of agents' strategic behavior. A growing literature, however, suggests that people do not quite behave like standard economic agents in a…

Delegation allows an agent to request that another agent completes a task. In many situations the task may be delegated onwards, and this process can repeat until it is eventually, successfully or unsuccessfully, performed. We consider…

Fairness has emerged as an important consideration in algorithmic decision-making. Unfairness occurs when an agent with higher merit obtains a worse outcome than an agent with lower merit. Our central point is that a primary cause of…

This chapter examines the link between delegation and lobbying, two themes central to political economy. Delegation models explore how legislatures manage uncertainty and control bureaucratic agents, while lobbying models analyze how…

We consider the design of experiments to evaluate treatments that are administered by self-interested agents, each seeking to achieve the highest evaluation and win the experiment. For example, in an advertising experiment, a company wishes…

This work considers a repeated principal-agent bandit game, where the principal can only interact with her environment through the agent. The principal and the agent have misaligned objectives and the choice of action is only left to the…

In this paper, we study belief elicitation about an uncertain future event, where the reports will affect a principal's decision. We study two problems that can arise in this setting: (1) Agents may have an interest in the outcome of the…

Many assignment systems require applicants to rank multi-attribute bundles (e.g., programs combining institution, major, and tuition). We study whether this reporting task is inherently difficult and how reporting interfaces affect accuracy…

Principal-agent problems arise when one party acts on behalf of another, leading to conflicts of interest. The economic literature has extensively studied principal-agent problems, and recent work has extended this to more complex scenarios…

As AI technologies improve, people are increasingly willing to delegate tasks to AI agents. In many cases, the human decision-maker chooses whether to delegate to an AI agent based on properties of the specific instance of the…

We analyze the delegation of pricing by participants, representing firms, to a collusive, self-learning algorithm in a repeated Bertrand experiment. In the baseline treatment, participants set prices themselves. In the other treatments,…

Many applications such as hiring and university admissions involve evaluation and selection of applicants. These tasks are fundamentally difficult, and require combining evidence from multiple different aspects (what we term "attributes").…

We study a problem where a group of agents has to decide how some fixed value should be shared among them. We are interested in settings where the share that each agent receives is based on how that agent is evaluated by other members of…

What is the purpose of pre-analysis plans, and how should they be designed? We model the interaction between an agent who analyzes data and a principal who makes a decision based on agent reports. The agent could be the manufacturer of a…

Consider the relationship between a regulator (the principal) and an experimenter (the agent) such as a pharmaceutical company. The pharmaceutical company wishes to sell a drug for profit, whereas the regulator wishes to allow only…

Consider the process of collective decision-making, in which a group of individuals interactively select a preferred outcome from among a universe of alternatives. In this context, "representation" is the activity of making an individual's…