Related papers: Network Creation Games with 2-Neighborhood Maximiz…
We study agents playing a pure coordination game on a large social network. Agents are restricted to coordinate locally, without access to a global communication device, and so different regions of the network will converge to different…
In this paper, we study the problem of consensus-based distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking where a network of players, abstracted as a directed graph, aim to minimize their own local cost functions non-cooperatively. Considering the…
We consider network aggregative games to model and study multi-agent populations in which each rational agent is influenced by the aggregate behavior of its neighbors, as specified by an underlying network. Specifically, we examine systems…
Atomic congestion games are a classic topic in network design, routing, and algorithmic game theory, and are capable of modeling congestion and flow optimization tasks in various application areas. While both the price of anarchy for such…
We propose a type of non-cooperative game, termed multi-cluster aggregative game, which is composed of clusters as players, where each cluster consists of collaborative agents with cost functions depending on their own decisions and the…
In this paper we study quality measures of different solution concepts for the multicast network design game on a ring topology. We recall from the literature a lower bound of 4/3 and prove a matching upper bound for the price of stability,…
Network connectivity plays an important role in the information exchange between different agents in the multi-level networks. In this paper, we establish a game-theoretic framework to capture the uncoordinated nature of the decision-making…
Game-theoretic algorithms are commonly benchmarked on recreational games, classical constructs from economic theory such as congestion and dispersion games, or entirely random game instances. While the past two decades have seen the rise of…
Various social contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection can be depicted as games of strategic interactions, where a player's well-being depends on her own action as well as on the actions taken by her…
Celebrity games, a new model of network creation games is introduced. The specific features of this model are that players have different celebrity weights and that a critical distance is taken into consideration. The aim of any player is…
Mechanism design for fully strategic agents commonly assumes broadcast nature of communication between agents of the system. Moreover, for mechanism design, the stability of Nash equilibrium (NE) is demonstrated by showing convergence of…
We consider a class of interdependent security games on networks where each node chooses a personal level of security investment. The attack probability experienced by a node is a function of her own investment and the investment by her…
The Naming Game is a model of non-equilibrium dynamics for the self-organized emergence of a linguistic convention or a communication system in a population of agents with pairwise local interactions. We present an extensive study of its…
Edges in real-world graphs are typically formed by a variety of factors and carry diverse relation semantics. For example, connections in a social network could indicate friendship, being colleagues, or living in the same neighborhood.…
In a social network, individuals express their opinions on several interdependent topics, and therefore the evolution of their opinions on these topics is also mutually dependent. In this work, we propose a differential game model for the…
Continually arriving information is communicated through a network of $n$ agents, with the value of information to the $j$'th recipient being a decreasing function of $j/n$, and communication costs paid by recipient. Regardless of details…
We explore stability and fairness considerations in decentralized networked markets with bilateral contracts, building on the trading networks framework [Hatfield et al., 2013]. In our trading network game, we show that a well-defined…
In the standard Mechanism Design framework, agents' messages are gathered at a central point and allocation/tax functions are calculated in a centralized manner, i.e., as functions of all network agents' messages. This requirement may cause…
Save for some special cases, current training methods for Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) are at best guaranteed to converge to a `local Nash equilibrium` (LNE). Such LNEs, however, can be arbitrarily far from an actual Nash…
In various online/offline multi-agent networked environments, it is very popular that the system can benefit from coordinating actions of two interacting agents at some cost of coordination. In this paper, we first formulate an optimization…