Related papers: Finding equilibria: simpler for pessimists, simple…

We study multiplayer turn-based games played on a finite directed graph such that each player aims at satisfying an omega-regular Boolean objective. Instead of the well-known notions of Nash equilibrium (NE) and subgame perfect equilibrium…

In this paper we study infinite horizon nonzero-sum stochastic games for controlled discrete-time Markov chains on a Polish state space with risk-sensitive ergodic cost criterion. Under suitable assumptions we show that the associated…

Consider a strongly monotone game where the players' utility functions include a reward function and a linear term for each dimension, with coefficients that are controlled by the manager. Gradient play converges to a unique Nash…

We show that the problem of deciding whether in a multi-player perfect information recursive game (i.e. a stochastic game with terminal rewards) there exists a stationary Nash equilibrium ensuring each player a certain payoff is Existential…

Finite-horizon probabilistic multiagent concurrent game systems, also known as finite multiplayer stochastic games, are a well-studied model in computer science due to their ability to represent a wide range of real-world scenarios…

This paper introduces risk-revising players to a class of games with incomplete information. These players enter the game with ex ante risk preferences represented by coherent risk measures and develop time-consistent interim revisions of…

We study risk-sensitive reinforcement learning (RL), a crucial field due to its ability to enhance decision-making in scenarios where it is essential to manage uncertainty and minimize potential adverse outcomes. Particularly, our work…

In finite games mixed Nash equilibria always exist, but pure equilibria may fail to exist. To assess the relevance of this nonexistence, we consider games where the payoffs are drawn at random. In particular, we focus on games where a large…

The central result of classical game theory states that every finite normal form game has a Nash equilibrium, provided that players are allowed to use randomized (mixed) strategies. However, in practice, humans are known to be bad at…

Understanding the affective, cognitive and behavioural processes involved in risk taking is essential for treatment and for setting environmental conditions to limit damage. Using Temporal Difference Reinforcement Learning (TDRL) we…

We study the existence of approximate pure Nash equilibria ($\alpha$-PNE) in weighted atomic congestion games with polynomial cost functions of maximum degree $d$. Previously it was known that $d$-approximate equilibria always exist, while…

This paper studies the last-iterate convergence properties of the exponential weights algorithm with constant learning rates. We consider a repeated interaction in discrete time, where each player uses an exponential weights algorithm…

Nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with impulse controls offer a realistic and far-reaching modelling framework for applications within finance, energy markets, and other areas, but the difficulty in solving such problems has…

We motivate and propose a new model for non-cooperative Markov game which considers the interactions of risk-aware players. This model characterizes the time-consistent dynamic "risk" from both stochastic state transitions (inherent to the…

We study the sample complexity of identifying the pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) in a two-player zero-sum matrix game with noise. Formally, we are given a stochastic model where any learner can sample an entry $(i,j)$ of the input…

Probabilistic model checking for stochastic games enables formal verification of systems that comprise competing or collaborating entities operating in a stochastic environment. Despite good progress in the area, existing approaches focus…

This article is related to risk-sensitive nonzero-sum stochastic differential games in the Markovian framework. This game takes into account the attitudes of the players toward risk and the utility is of exponential form. We show the…

In this paper, we examine the long-run behavior of regularized, no-regret learning in finite games. A well-known result in the field states that the empirical frequencies of no-regret play converge to the game's set of coarse correlated…

We study $n$-player turn-based games played on a finite directed graph. For each play, the players have to pay a cost that they want to minimize. Instead of the well-known notion of Nash equilibrium (NE), we focus on the notion of subgame…

Risk-aversion and bounded rationality are two key characteristics of human decision-making. Risk-averse quantal-response equilibrium (RQE) is a solution concept that incorporates these features, providing a more realistic depiction of human…