Related papers: Backflash Attack on Coherent One-Way Quantum Key D…
The existing decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) beating photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack provides a more accurate method to estimate secure key rate, while it still considers that only single-photon pulses can generate secure…
In this article we present a new prepare and measure quantum key distribution protocol that decouples the necessary quantum channel error estimation from its dependency on sifting, or otherwise post-selecting, the detection outcomes. Rather…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables information-theoretically secure communication against eavesdropping. However, phase instability remains a challenge across many QKD applications, particularly in schemes such as twin-field QKD and…
An entanglement witness approach to quantum coherent state key distribution and a system for its practical implementation are described. In this approach, eavesdropping can be detected by a change in sign of either of two witness functions,…
Quantum key distribution can be performed with practical signal sources such as weak coherent pulses. One example of such a scheme is the Bennett-Brassard protocol that can be implemented via polarization of the signals, or equivalent…
Nowadays Quantum Key Distribution represents the most mature quantum technology, and multiple countries as well as private institutions are building their quantum network. However, QKD devices are still far from representing a product…
Detector dead time is typically treated as a fixed parameter in quantum key distribution (QKD) security analyses. In practice, however, the effective recovery time of single-photon avalanche photodiodes (SPADs) depends on the incident count…
Advances in highly sensitive detection techniques for classical coherent communication systems have reduced the received signal power requirements to a few photons per bit. At this level one can take advantage of the quantum noise to create…
We study potential security vulnerabilities of a single-photon detector based on superconducting transition-edge sensor. In a simple experiment, we show that an adversary could fake a photon number result at a certain wavelength by sending…
Passive light-source side channel in quantum key distribution (QKD) makes the quantum signals more distinguishable thus provides additional information about the quantum signal to an eavesdropper. The explicit eavesdropping strategies aimed…
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) leverages the principles of quantum mechanics to provide theoretically unconditional security for cryptographic key sharing. However, practical implementations remain vulnerable due to non-ideal devices and…
The security of source has become an increasingly important issue in quantum cryptography. Based on the framework of measurement-device-independent quantum-key-distribution (MDI-QKD), the source becomes the only region exploitable by a…
The Ekert 91 quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol appears to be secure whatever devices legitimate users adopt for the protocol, as long as the devices give a result that violates Bell's inequality. However, this is not the case if they…
The eavesdropper technique nowadays is already improved from the theoretical perspective to the experimental perspective. The technique now more focusing on the loopholes of the components used such as modulator, laser, and detector. These…
Single-photon avalanche detectors (SPADs) have enabled various applications in emerging photonic quantum information technologies in recent years. However, despite many efforts to improve SPAD's performance, the design of SPADs remained…
The security of quantum communication using a weak coherent source requires an accurate knowledge of the source's mean photon number. Finite calibration precision or an active manipulation by an attacker may cause the actual emitted photon…
We compare the performance of various quantum key distribution (QKD) systems using a novel single-photon detector, which combines frequency up-conversion in a periodically poled lithium niobate (PPLN) waveguide and a silicon avalanche…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two spatially separated parties to securely generate a cryptographic key. The first QKD protocol, published by C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard in 1984 (BB84), describes how this is achieved by…
We present and analyze a quantum key distribution protocol based on sending entangled N-qubit states instead of single-qubit ones as in the trail-blazing scheme by Bennett and Brassard (BB84). Since the qubits are sent individually, an…
We control using bright light an actively-quenched avalanche single-photon detector. Actively-quenched detectors are commonly used for quantum key distribution (QKD) in the visible and near-infrared range. This study shows that these…