Related papers: Signaling Design
Supervised learning typically focuses on learning transferable representations from training examples annotated by humans. While rich annotations (like soft labels) carry more information than sparse annotations (like hard labels), they are…
We model competition on a credence goods market governed by an imperfect label, signaling high quality, as a rank-order tournament between firms. In this market interaction, asymmetric firms jointly and competitively control the aggregate…
We examine a controlled school choice model where students are categorized into different types, and the distribution of these types within a school influences its priority structure. This study provides a general framework that integrates…
This paper characterizes informational outcomes in a model of dynamic signaling with vanishing commitment power. It shows that contrary to popular belief, informative equilibria with payoff-relevant signaling can exist without requiring…
Traditional economic models typically treat private information, or signals, as generated from some underlying state. Recent work has explicated alternative models, where signals correspond to interpretations of available information. We…
Most products are produced and sold by supply chain networks, where an interconnected network of producers and intermediaries set prices to maximize their profits. I show that there exists a unique equilibrium in a price-setting game on a…
In the new digital age, information is available in large quantities. Since information consumes primarily the attention of its recipients, the scarcity of attention is becoming the main limiting factor. In this study, we investigate the…
There is growing experimental evidence that $Q$-learning agents may learn to charge supracompetitive prices. We provide the first theoretical explanation for this behavior in infinite repeated games. Firms update their pricing policies…
We study a novel approach to information design in the standard traffic model of network congestion games. It captures the natural condition that the demand is unknown to the users of the network. A principal (e.g., a mobility service)…
This paper studies a communication game between an uninformed decision maker and two perfectly informed senders with conflicting interests. Senders can misreport information at a cost that increases with the size of the misrepresentation.…
A sender with private preferences would like to influence a receiver's action by providing information through a statistical test. The technology for information production is controlled by a monopolist intermediary, who offers a menu of…
A competitive learning model was introduced in Ref. 1 (A. Mehta and J. M. Luck, Phys. Rev. E 60, 5, 1999), in which the learning is outcome-related. Every individual chooses between a pair of existing strategies or types, guided by a…
The theory of two-sided matching has been extensively developed and applied to many real-life application domains. As the theory has been applied to increasingly diverse types of environments, researchers and practitioners have encountered…
Persistent economic competition is often justified as a mechanism of innovation, efficiency, and welfare maximization. Yet empirical evidence across disciplines reveals that competition systematically generates fragility, inequality, and…
Social marketing is becoming increasingly important in contemporary business. Central to social marketing is quantifying how consumers choose between alternatives and how they influence each other. This work considers a new but simple…
Models of social learning feature either binary signals or abstract signal structures often deprived of micro-foundations. Both models are limited when analyzing interim results or performing empirical analysis. We present a method of…
We study decentralized markets with the presence of middlemen, modeled by a non-cooperative bargaining game in trading networks. Our goal is to investigate how the network structure of the market and the role of middlemen influence the…
This paper studies a Stackelberg game wherein a sender (leader) attempts to shape the information of a less informed receiver (follower) who in turn takes an action that determines the payoff for both players. The sender chooses signals to…
We argue that deterministic market clearing formulations introduce arbitrary distortions between day-ahead and expected real-time prices that bias economic incentives and block diversification. We extend and analyze the stochastic clearing…
Active learning is a learning strategy whereby the machine learning algorithm actively identifies and labels data points to optimize its learning. This strategy is particularly effective in domains where an abundance of unlabeled data…