Related papers: Strong Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Bounded G…
We investigate a voting scenario with two groups of agents whose preferences depend on a ground truth that cannot be directly observed. The majority's preferences align with the ground truth, while the minorities disagree. Focusing on…
This paper presents a model of multi-group Bayesian games (MBGs) to describe the group behavior in Bayesian games, and gives methods to find (strongly) multi-group Bayesian Nash equilibria (MBNE) of this model with a proposed…
The strategic selection of resources by selfish agents has long been a key area of research, with Resource Selection Games and Congestion Games serving as prominent examples. In these traditional frameworks, agents choose from a set of…
Bayesian rationality in strategic games presumes that it is possible to translate strategic uncertainty into imperfect information. Correlated equilibrium is guided by the idea that players are Bayes rational, have a common prior, and…
We study Bayesian coordination games where agents receive noisy private information over the game's payoff structure, and over each others' actions. If private information over actions is precise, we find that agents can coordinate on…
We study the problem of finding robust equilibria in multiplayer concurrent games with mean payoff objectives. A $(k,t)$-robust equilibrium is a strategy profile such that no coalition of size $k$ can improve the payoff of one its member by…
We show that a Bayesian strategy map profile is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium independent of any prior if and only if the Bayesian strategy map profile, evaluated at any type profile, is the Nash equilibrium of the so-called local…
We prove the existence of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) of general-sum Bayesian games with continuous types and finite actions under the conditions that the utility functions and the prior type distributions are continuous concerning the…
Colonel Blotto games with discrete strategy spaces effectively illustrate the intricate nature of multidimensional strategic reasoning. This paper studies the equilibrium set of such games where, in line with prior experimental work, the…
This paper proposes the notion of robust PBE in a general competing mechanism game of incomplete information where a mechanism allows its designer to send a message to himself at the same time agents send messages. It identifies the utility…
In repeated-game applications where both the collusive and non-collusive outcomes can be supported as equilibria, researchers must resolve underlying selection questions if theory will be used to understand counterfactual policies. One…
Cooperative Bayesian games (BGs) can model decision-making problems for teams of agents under imperfect information, but require space and computation time that is exponential in the number of agents. While agent independence has been used…
The study of learning in games typically assumes that each player always has access to all of their actions. However, in many practical scenarios, players' available actions might be restricted due to exogenous stochasticity. To model this…
We study the complexity of equilibrium computation in discrete preference games. These games were introduced by Chierichetti, Kleinberg, and Oren (EC '13, JCSS '18) to model decision-making by agents in a social network that choose a…
Meirowitz [17] showed existence of continuous behavioural function equilibria for Bayesian games with non-finite type and action spaces. A key condition for the proof of the existence result is equi-continuity of behavioural functions…
Game theory relies heavily on the availability of cardinal utility functions, but in fields such as matching markets, only ordinal preferences are typically elicited. The literature focuses on mechanisms with simple dominant strategies, but…
We discuss stochastic dynamics of populations of individuals playing games. Our models possess two evolutionarily stable strategies: an efficient one, where a population is in a state with the maximal payoff (fitness) and a risk-dominant…
Network congestion games are a well-understood model of multi-agent strategic interactions. Despite their ubiquitous applications, it is not clear whether it is possible to design information structures to ameliorate the overall experience…
In response to a change, individuals may choose to follow the responses of their friends or, alternatively, to change their friends. To model these decisions, consider a game where players choose their behaviors and friendships. In…
We study a model of strategic coordination based on a class of games with incomplete information known as Global Games. Under the assumption of Poisson-distributed signals and a Gamma prior distribution on state of the system, we…