Related papers: Optimal Metric Distortion for Matching on the Line
Matching markets involve heterogeneous agents (typically from two parties) who are paired for mutual benefit. During the last decade, matching markets have emerged and grown rapidly through the medium of the Internet. They have evolved into…
Recommender systems play an increasingly crucial role in shaping people's opportunities, particularly in online dating platforms. It is essential from the user's perspective to increase the probability of matching with a suitable partner…
We study the Price of Anarchy of mechanisms for the well-known problem of one-sided matching, or house allocation, with respect to the social welfare objective. We consider both ordinal mechanisms, where agents submit preference lists over…
In this paper, we study two variants of the online metric matching problem. The first problem is the online metric matching problem where all the servers are placed at one of two positions in the metric space. We show that a simple greedy…
We initiate the work on maximin share (MMS) fair allocation of m indivisible chores to n agents using only their ordinal preferences, from both algorithmic and mechanism design perspectives. The previous best-known approximation is 2-1/n by…
In the classical version of online bipartite matching, there is a given set of offline vertices (aka agents) and another set of vertices (aka items) that arrive online. When each item arrives, its incident edges -- the agents who like the…
Allocating indivisible items among a set of agents is a frequently studied discrete optimization problem. In the setting considered in this work, the agents' preferences over the items are assumed to be identical. We consider a very recent…
Applications such as employees sharing office spaces over a workweek can be modeled as problems where agents are matched to resources over multiple rounds. Agents' requirements limit the set of compatible resources and the rounds in which…
We consider the problem of searching for an object on a line at an unknown distance OPT from the original position of the searcher, in the presence of a cost of d for each time the searcher changes direction. This is a generalization of the…
We study the problem of finding "fair" stable matchings in the Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete lists (SMI). In particular, we seek stable matchings that are optimal with respect to profile, which is a vector that indicates the…
We consider a setting where goods are allocated to agents by way of an allocation platform (e.g., a matching platform). An ``allocation facilitator'' aims to increase the overall utility/social-good of the allocation by encouraging (some of…
This paper presents a new research direction for the Min-cost Perfect Matching with Delays (MPMD) - a problem introduced by Emek et al. (STOC'16). In the original version of this problem, we are given an $n$-point metric space, where…
We study algorithms for estimating the size of maximum matching. This problem has been subject to extensive research. For $n$-vertex graphs, Bhattacharya, Kiss, and Saranurak [FOCS'23] (BKS) showed that an estimate that is within…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible items on a path among agents. The objective is to find a fair and efficient allocation in which each agent's bundle forms a contiguous block on the line. We say that an instance is \emph{$(a,…
We study an online version of the max-min fair allocation problem for indivisible items. In this problem, items arrive one by one, and each item must be allocated irrevocably on arrival to one of $n$ agents, who have additive valuations for…
We study the problem of aligning the supports of distributions. Compared to the existing work on distribution alignment, support alignment does not require the densities to be matched. We propose symmetric support difference as a divergence…
The notion of distortion in social choice problems has been defined to measure the loss in efficiency -- typically measured by the utilitarian social welfare, the sum of utilities of the participating agents -- due to having access only to…
Aggregating the preferences of individuals into a collective decision is the core subject of study of social choice theory. In 2006, Procaccia and Rosenschein considered a utilitarian social choice setting, where the agents have explicit…
We study social welfare in one-sided matching markets where the goal is to efficiently allocate n items to n agents that each have a complete, private preference list and a unit demand over the items. Our focus is on allocation mechanisms…
We study Pareto-optimal risk sharing in economies with heterogeneous attitudes toward risk, where agents' preferences are modeled by distortion risk measures. Building on comonotonic and counter-monotonic improvement results, we show that…