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Partially observable stochastic games provide a rich mathematical paradigm for modeling multi-agent dynamic decision making under uncertainty and partial information. However, they generally do not admit closed-form solutions and are…
We introduce Boolean Observation Games, a subclass of multi-player finite strategic games with incomplete information and qualitative objectives. In Boolean observation games, each player is associated with a finite set of propositional…
Consider a two-player zero-sum stochastic game where the transition function can be embedded in a given feature space. We propose a two-player Q-learning algorithm for approximating the Nash equilibrium strategy via sampling. The algorithm…
Recent extensions to dynamic games of the well-known fictitious play learning procedure in static games were proved to globally converge to stationary Nash equilibria in two important classes of dynamic games (zero-sum and…
This work studies Stackelberg network interdiction games -- an important class of games in which a defender first allocates (randomized) defense resources to a set of critical nodes on a graph while an adversary chooses its path to attack…
Many preference elicitation algorithms consider preference over propositional logic formulas or items with different attributes. In sequential decision making, a user's preference can be a preorder over possible outcomes, each of which is a…
There has been substantial progress in the inference of formal behavioural specifications from sample trajectories, for example, using Linear Temporal Logic (LTL). However, these techniques cannot handle specifications that correctly…
Weighted timed games are two-player zero-sum games played in a timed automaton equipped with integer weights. We consider optimal reachability objectives, in which one of the players, that we call Min, wants to reach a target location while…
Game theory relies heavily on the availability of cardinal utility functions, but in fields such as matching markets, only ordinal preferences are typically elicited. The literature focuses on mechanisms with simple dominant strategies, but…
This paper investigates stochastic generalized dynamic games with coupling chance constraints, where agents have incomplete information about uncertainties satisfying a concentration of measure property. This problem, in general, is…
Strategic decision-making in uncertain and adversarial environments is crucial for the security of modern systems and infrastructures. A salient feature of many optimal decision-making policies is a level of unpredictability, or randomness,…
We consider multi-agent systems where agents' preferences are aggregated via sequential majority voting: each decision is taken by performing a sequence of pairwise comparisons where each comparison is a weighted majority vote among the…
The window mechanism was introduced by Chatterjee et al. to strengthen classical game objectives with time bounds. It permits to synthesize system controllers that exhibit acceptable behaviors within a configurable time frame, all along…
In this paper, we consider two-player zero-sum matrix and stochastic games and develop learning dynamics that are payoff-based, convergent, rational, and symmetric between the two players. Specifically, the learning dynamics for matrix…
In this article, we revisit a communication-control co-design problem for a class of two-player stochastic differential games on an infinite horizon. Each 'player' represents two active decision makers, namely a scheduler and a remote…
Several notions of game enjoy a Nash-like notion of equilibrium without guarantee of existence. There are different ways of weakening a definition of Nash-like equilibrium in order to guarantee the existence of a weakened equilibrium.…
We consider 2-player games played on a finite state space for infinite rounds. The games are concurrent: in each round, the two players choose their moves simultaneously; the current state and the moves determine the successor. We consider…
Many studies have shown that humans are "predictably irrational": they do not act in a fully rational way, but their deviations from rational behavior are quite systematic. Our goal is to see the extent to which we can explain and justify…
This paper studies the optimization of strategies in the context of possibly randomized two players zero-sum games with incomplete information. We compare 5 algorithms for tuning the parameters of strategies over a benchmark of 12 games. A…
The paper [Ras15a] introduced distribution-valued games. This game-theoretic model uses probability distributions as payoffs for games in order to express uncertainty about the payoffs. The player's preferences for different payoffs are…