Related papers: Online Housing Market
We consider a one-sided assignment market or exchange network with transferable utility and propose a model for the dynamics of bargaining in such a market. Our dynamical model is local, involving iterative updates of 'offers' based on…
Models of auctions or tendering processes are introduced. In every round of bidding the players select their bid from a probability distribution and whenever a bid is unsuccessful, it is discarded and replaced. For simple models, the…
We consider reallocation problems in settings where the initial endowment of each agent consists of a subset of the resources. The private information of the players is their value for every possible subset of the resources. The goal is to…
Reallocating resources to get mutually beneficial outcomes is a fundamental problem in various multi-agent settings. While finding an arbitrary Pareto optimal allocation is generally easy, checking whether a particular allocation is Pareto…
The assignment game models a housing market where buyers and sellers are matched, and transaction prices are set so that the resulting allocation is stable. Shapley and Shubik showed that every stable allocation is necessarily built on a…
In many economic contexts, agents from a same population team up to better exploit their human capital. In such contexts (often called "roommate matching problems"), stable matchings may fail to exist even when utility is transferable. We…
We present a novel bilateral negotiation model that allows a self-interested agent to learn how to negotiate over multiple issues in the presence of user preference uncertainty. The model relies upon interpretable strategy templates…
We study the power of (competitive) algorithms with predictions in a multiagent setting. We introduce a two predictor framework, that assumes that agents use one predictor for their future (self) behavior, and one for the behavior of the…
Recent advances in machine learning have spurred significant interest in learning-augmented algorithms, particularly for online optimization. A growing body of work has studied online bidding in this framework, aiming to characterize the…
This paper investigates online distributed aggregative games with time-varying cost functions, where agents are interconnected through an unbalanced communication graph. Due to the distributed and noncooperative nature of the game, some…
In the roommate matching model, given a set of 2n agents and n rooms, we find an assignment of a pair of agents to a room. Although the roommate matching problem is well studied, the study of the model when agents have preference over both…
Stable matching, a classical model for two-sided markets, has long been studied with little consideration for how each side's preferences are learned. With the advent of massive online markets powered by data-driven matching platforms, it…
Most prior work on online matching problems has been with the flexibility of keeping some vertices unmatched. We study three related online matching problems with the constraint of matching every vertex, i.e., with no rejections. We adopt a…
This paper proposes a new one-sided matching market model in which every agent has a cost function that is allowed to take a negative value. Our model aims to capture the situation where some agents can profit by exchanging their obtained…
The Stable Roommates problems are characterized by the preferences of agents over other agents as roommates. A solution is a partition of the agents into pairs that are acceptable to each other (i.e., they are in the preference lists of…
Online double auctions (DAs) model a dynamic two-sided matching problem with private information and self-interest, and are relevant for dynamic resource and task allocation problems. We present a general method to design truthful DAs, such…
In market modeling, one often treats buyers as a homogeneous group. In this paper we consider buyers with heterogeneous preferences and products available in many variants. Such a framework allows us to successfully model various market…
We consider mechanisms for markets that are double-sided and have players with multi-dimensional strategic spaces on at least one side. The players of the market are strategic, and act to optimize their own utilities. The mechanism…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible objects to a set of rational agents where each agent's final utility depends on the intrinsic valuation of the allocated item as well as the allocation within the agent's local neighbourhood.…
Financial markets are subject to long periods of polarized behavior, such as bull-market or bear-market phases, in which the vast majority of market participants seem to almost exclusively choose one action (between buying or selling) over…