Related papers: Rationalizability and Monotonocity in Games with I…

In game theory and artificial intelligence, decision making models often involve maximizing expected utility, which does not respect ordinal invariance. In this paper, the author discusses the possibility of preserving ordinal invariance…

An agent, or a coalition of agents, faces an ethical dilemma between several statements if she is forced to make a conscious choice between which of these statements will be true. This paper proposes to capture ethical dilemmas as a…

In many common interactive scenarios, participants lack information about other participants, and specifically about the preferences of other participants. In this work, we model an extreme case of incomplete information, which we term…

The principle that rational agents should maximize expected utility or choiceworthiness is intuitively plausible in many ordinary cases of decision-making under uncertainty. But it is less plausible in cases of extreme, low-probability risk…

For zero-sum two-player continuous-time games with integral payoff and incomplete information on one side, one shows that the optimal strategy of the informed player can be computed through an auxiliary optimization problem over some…

In imperfect information games (e.g. Bridge, Skat, Poker), one of the fundamental considerations is to infer the missing information while at the same time avoiding the disclosure of private information. Disregarding the issue of protecting…

Mechanism design has found considerable application to the construction of agent-interaction protocols. In the standard setting, the type (e.g., utility function) of an agent is not known by other agents, nor is it known by the mechanism…

Information uncertainty is one of the major challenges facing applications of game theory. In the context of Stackelberg games, various approaches have been proposed to deal with the leader's incomplete knowledge about the follower's…

Selective rationalization improves neural network interpretability by identifying a small subset of input features -- the rationale -- that best explains or supports the prediction. A typical rationalization criterion, i.e. maximum mutual…

The combination of the Bayesian game and learning has a rich history, with the idea of controlling a single agent in a system composed of multiple agents with unknown behaviors given a set of types, each specifying a possible behavior for…

This paper focuses on finite-player incomplete information games where players may hold mutually inconsistent beliefs without a common prior. We introduce absolute continuity of beliefs, extending the classical notion of absolutely…

We study zero-sum differential games with state constraints and one-sided information, where the informed player (Player 1) has a categorical payoff type unknown to the uninformed player (Player 2). The goal of Player 1 is to minimize his…

We propose a learning dynamics to model how strategic agents repeatedly play a continuous game while relying on an information platform to learn an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In each time step, the platform updates a belief estimate…

We introduce a "high probability" framework for repeated games with incomplete information. In our non-equilibrium setting, players aim to guarantee a certain payoff with high probability, rather than in expected value. We provide a high…

Strategic-form min-max game theory examines the existence, multiplicity, selection of equilibria, and the worst-case computational complexity under perfect rationality. However, in many applications, games are drawn from an ensemble, and…

We consider distributed learning problem in games with an unknown cost-relevant parameter, and aim to find the Nash equilibrium while learning the true parameter. Inspired by the social learning literature, we propose a distributed…

This paper studies multi-user communication systems with two groups of users: leaders which possess system information, and followers which have no system information using the formulation of Stackelberg games. In such games, the leaders…

We consider how an agent should update her beliefs when her beliefs are represented by a set P of probability distributions, given that the agent makes decisions using the minimax criterion, perhaps the best-studied and most commonly-used…

This paper examines the integration of computational complexity into game theoretic models. The example focused on is the Prisoner's Dilemma, repeated for a finite length of time. We show that a minimal bound on the players' computational…

This paper studies a game in which an informed sender with state-independent preferences uses verifiable messages to convince a receiver to choose an action from a finite set. We characterize the equilibrium outcomes of the game and compare…