Related papers: Stable Matching with Interviews
This paper studies two-sided many-to-one matching in which firms have complementary preferences. We show that stable matchings exist under a balancedness condition that rules out a specific type of odd-length cycles formed by firms'…
I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one-to-one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses two…
Gale and Shapley introduced a matching problem between two sets of agents where each agent on one side has an exogenous preference ordering over the agents on the other side. They defined a matching as stable if no unmatched pair can both…
Two-sided online matching platforms are employed in various markets. However, agents' preferences in the current market are usually implicit and unknown, thus needing to be learned from data. With the growing availability of dynamic side…
We study the problem of online learning in two-sided non-stationary matching markets, where the objective is to converge to a stable match. In particular, we consider the setting where one side of the market, the arms, has fixed known set…
We study the problem of online learning in competitive settings in the context of two-sided matching markets. In particular, one side of the market, the agents, must learn about their preferences over the other side, the firms, through…
We study the problem of pure exploration in matching markets under uncertain preferences, where the goal is to identify a stable matching with confidence parameter $\delta$ and minimal sample complexity. Agents learn preferences via…
In many two-sided markets, the parties to be matched have incomplete information about their characteristics. We consider the settings where the parties engaged are extremely patient and are interested in long-term partnerships. Hence, once…
In a dynamic matching market, such as a marriage or job market, how should agents balance accepting a proposed match with the cost of continuing their search? We consider this problem in a discrete setting, in which agents have cardinal…
Results from the communication complexity literature have demonstrated that stable matching requires communication: one cannot find or verify a stable match without having access to essentially all of the ordinal preference information held…
We show that the ratio of matched individuals to blocking pairs grows linearly with the number of propose--accept rounds executed by the Gale--Shapley algorithm for the stable marriage problem. Consequently, the participants can arrive at…
The stable matching problem is a prototype model in economics and social sciences where agents act selfishly to optimize their own satisfaction, subject to mutually conflicting constraints. A stable matching is a pairing of adjacent…
The assignment game models a housing market where buyers and sellers are matched, and transaction prices are set so that the resulting allocation is stable. Shapley and Shubik showed that every stable allocation is necessarily built on a…
We consider a two-sided matching problem in which the agents on one side have dichotomous preferences and the other side representing institutions has strict preferences (priorities). It captures several important applications in matching…
In this paper, we propose a new recommendation algorithm for addressing the problem of two-sided online matching markets with complementary preferences and quota constraints, where agents' preferences are unknown a priori and must be…
The balance between convergence and diversity is a key issue of evolutionary multi-objective optimization. The recently proposed stable matching-based selection provides a new perspective to handle this balance under the framework of…
The matching literature often recommends market centralization under the assumption that agents know their own preferences and that their preferences are fixed. We find counterevidence to this assumption in a quasi-experiment. In Germany's…
We initiate the study of deep learning for the automated design of two-sided matching mechanisms. What is of most interest is to use machine learning to understand the possibility of new tradeoffs between strategy-proofness and stability.…
The standard two-sided and one-sided matching problems, and the closely related school choice problem, have been widely studied from an axiomatic viewpoint. A small number of algorithms dominate the literature. For two-sided matching, the…
A well known result states that stability criterion for matchings in two-sided markets doesn't ensure uniqueness. This opens the door for a moral question with regard to the optimal stable matching from a social point of view. Here, a new…