Related papers: Practical Spoofing Attacks on Galileo Open Service…

Intentional interference, and in particular GNSS spoofing, is currently one of the most significant concerns of the Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) community. With the adoption of Open Service Navigation Message Authentication…

Galileo is the first global navigation satellite system to authenticate their civilian signals through the Open Service Galileo Message Authentication (OSNMA) protocol. However, OSNMA delays the time to obtain a first position and time fix,…

To ensure the authenticity of navigation data, Galileo Open Service navigation message authentication (OSNMA) requires loose synchronization between the receiver clock and the system time. This means that during the period between clock…

Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) are ubiquitously relied upon for positioning and timing. Detection and prevention of attacks against GNSS have been researched over the last decades, but many of these attacks and countermeasures…

Civilian-GNSS is vulnerable to signal spoofing attacks, and countermeasures based on cryptographic authentication are being proposed to protect against these attacks. Both Galileo and GPS are currently testing broadcast authentication…

Global navigation satellite systems (GNSSs) are implementing security mechanisms: examples are Galileo open service navigation message authentication (OS-NMA) and GPS chips-message robust authentication (CHIMERA). Each of these mechanisms…

GNSSs are vulnerable to attacks of two kinds: jamming (i.e. denying access to the signal) and spoofing (i.e. impersonating a legitimate satellite). These attacks have been extensively studied, and we have a myriad of countermeasures to…

With the introduction of Navigation Message Authentication (NMA), future Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSSs) prevent spoofing by simulation, i.e., the generation of forged satellite signals based on public information. However,…

This paper introduces the Time Synchronization Attack Rejection and Mitigation (TSARM) technique for Time Synchronization Attacks (TSAs) over the Global Positioning System (GPS). The technique estimates the clock bias and drift of the GPS…

The operation of critical infrastructures such as the electrical power grid, cellphone towers, and financial institutions relies on precise timing provided by stationary GPS receivers. These GPS devices are vulnerable to a type of spoofing…

This paper presents a novel time synchronization attack (TSA) model for the Global Positioning System (GPS) based on clock data behavior changes in a higher-order derivative domain. Further, the time synchronization attack rejection and…

As rail transport moves toward higher degrees of automation under initiatives like the R2DATO project [1], accurate and reliable train localization has become essential. Global Satellite Navigation System (GNSS) is considered as a main…

Autonomous vehicles (AVs) rely on the Global Positioning System (GPS) or Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) for precise (Positioning, Navigation, and Timing) PNT solutions. However, the vulnerability of GPS signals to intentional…

Global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) provide pervasive accurate positioning and timing services for a large gamut of applications, from Time based One-Time Passwords (TOPT), to power grid and cellular systems. However, there can be…

As TESLA-enabled GNSS for authenticated positioning reaches ubiquity, receivers must use an onboard, GNSS-independent clock and carefully constructed time synchronization algorithms to assert the authenticity afforded. This work provides…

In order to combat the spoofing of global navigation satellite system (GNSS) signals we propose a novel approach for satellite signal authentication based on information-theoretic security. In particular we superimpose to the navigation…

Many operations in power grids, such as fault detection and event location estimation, depend on precise timing information. In this paper, a novel Time Synchronization Attack (TSA) is proposed to attack the timing information in smart…

A novel time synchronization attack (TSA) on wide area monitoring systems in smart grid has been identified in the first part of this paper. A cross layer detection mechanism is proposed to combat TSA in part II of this paper. In the…

The increasing reliance on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), particularly the Global Positioning System (GPS), underscores the urgent need to safeguard these technologies against malicious threats such as spoofing and jamming. As…

Many operations in power grids, such as fault detection and event location estimation, depend on precise timing information. In this paper, a novel time stamp attack (TSA) is proposed to attack the timing information in smart grid. Since…