Related papers: Blackwell Equilibrium in Repeated Games
In 1953, Kuhn showed that every sequential game has a Nash equilibrium by showing that a procedure, named ``backward induction'' in game theory, yields a Nash equilibrium. It actually yields Nash equilibria that define a proper subclass of…
In this paper, we study nonzero-sum separable games, which are continuous games whose payoffs take a sum-of-products form. Included in this subclass are all finite games and polynomial games. We investigate the structure of equilibria in…
We add here another layer to the literature on nonatomic anonymous games started with the 1973 paper by Schmeidler. More specifically, we define a new notion of equilibrium which we call $\varepsilon$-estimated equilibrium and prove its…
We introduce a set-valued solution concept, M equilibrium, to capture empirical regularities from over half a century of game-theory experiments. We show M equilibrium serves as a meta theory for various models that hitherto were considered…
We consider a nonzero-sum N-player Markov game on an abstract measurable state space with compact metric action spaces. The payoff functions are bounded Carath\'eodory functions and the transitions of the system are assumed to have a…
This paper studies $n$-person simultaneous-move games with linear best response function, where individuals interact within a given network structure. This class of games have been used to model various settings, such as, public goods,…
In this paper we consider continuity of the set of Nash equilibria and approximate Nash equilibria for parameterized games. For parameterized games with unique Nash equilibria, the continuity of this equilibrium mapping is well-known.…
This paper presents a technique for approximating, up to any precision, the set of subgame-perfect equilibria (SPE) in discounted repeated games. The process starts with a single hypercube approximation of the set of SPE. Then the initial…
This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept "robust perfect equilibrium" for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations. Such an equilibrium is shown to exist (in symmetric mixed…
In the context of large population symmetric games, approximate Nash equilibria are introduced through equilibrium solutions of the corresponding mean field game in the sense that the individual gain from optimal unilateral deviation under…
We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form socially desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coordination. Towards this end, we consider coordination games where agents have different intrinsic…
Nash equilibrium is one of the most influential solution concepts in game theory. With the development of computer science and artificial intelligence, there is an increasing demand on Nash equilibrium computation, especially for Internet…
We study the problem of computing an approximate Nash equilibrium of continuous-action game without access to gradients. Such game access is common in reinforcement learning settings, where the environment is typically treated as a black…
Due to the lack of coordination, it is unlikely that the selfish players of a strategic game reach a socially good state. A possible way to cope with selfishness is to compute a desired outcome (if it is tractable) and impose it. However…
This paper introduces a new solution concept for non-cooperative games in normal form with no ties and pure strategies: the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium. The players are rational in all possible worlds and know each other's strategies…
Nash equilibrium is a popular solution concept for solving imperfect-information games in practice. However, it has a major drawback: it does not preclude suboptimal play in branches of the game tree that are not reached in equilibrium.…
Many models from a variety of areas involve the computation of an equilibrium or fixed point of some kind. Examples include Nash equilibria in games; market equilibria; computing optimal strategies and the values of competitive games…
Games with incomplete preferences are an important model for studying rational decision-making in scenarios where players face incomplete information about their preferences and must contend with incomparable outcomes. We study the problem…
We consider a finite horizon repeated game with $N$ selfish players who observe their types privately and take actions, which are publicly observed. Their actions and types jointly determine their instantaneous rewards. In each period,…
A fundamental open problem in monotone game theory is the computation of a specific generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) among all the available ones, e.g. the optimal equilibrium with respect to a system-level objective. The existing GNE…