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Let us consider two companies A and B. Both of them are interested in buying a set of some goods. The company A is a big corporation and it knows the actual value of the good on the market and is able to observe the previous values of them.…
Blameworthiness of an agent or a coalition of agents is often defined in terms of the principle of alternative possibilities: for the coalition to be responsible for an outcome, the outcome must take place and the coalition should have had…
In this paper we model a game such that all strategies are non-revealing, with imperfect recall and incomplete information. We also introduce a modified sliding-block code as a linear transformation which generates common knowledge of how…
Non-Bayesian social learning theory provides a framework that models distributed inference for a group of agents interacting over a social network. In this framework, each agent iteratively forms and communicates beliefs about an unknown…
Strategic agents in incomplete-information environments have a conflicted relationship with uncertainty: it can keep them unpredictable to their opponents, but it must also be overcome to predict the actions of those opponents. We use a…
We present results on simulations of a stock market with heterogeneous, cumulative information setup. We find a non-monotonic behaviour of traders' returns as a function of their information level. Particularly, the average informed agents…
We study a model of games that combines concurrency, imperfect information and stochastic aspects. Those are finite states games in which, at each round, the two players choose, simultaneously and independently, an action. Then a successor…
High performance machine learning models have become highly dependent on the availability of large quantity and quality of training data. To achieve this, various central agencies such as the government have suggested for different data…
We study the market impact of a meta-order in the framework of the Minority Game. This amounts to studying the response of the market when introducing a trader who buys or sells a fixed amount h for a finite time T. This perturbation…
In this paper, we address the problem of a two-player linear quadratic differential game with incomplete information, a scenario commonly encountered in multi-agent control, human-robot interaction (HRI), and approximation methods for…
The computation of equilibrium prices at which the supply of goods matches their demand typically relies on complete information on agents' private attributes, e.g., suppliers' cost functions, which are often unavailable in practice.…
We present a new strategic voting model where we use uncertainty representation to model preferences. Specifically, we use probability sets as uncertainty representations, together with lower and upper expected utility gains to take…
Among the strategic choices made by today's economic actors are choices about algorithms and computational resources. Different access to computational resources may result in a kind of economic asymmetry analogous to information asymmetry.…
Algorithmic trading in modern financial markets is widely acknowledged to exhibit strategic, game-theoretic behaviors whose complexity can be difficult to model. A recent series of papers (Chriss, 2024b,c,a, 2025) has made progress in the…
In context-specific applications such as robotics, telecommunications, and healthcare, artificial intelligence systems often face the challenge of limited training data. This scarcity introduces epistemic uncertainty, i.e., reducible…
We propose a framework for strategic voting when a voter may lack knowledge about the preferences of other voters, or about other voters' knowledge about her own preference. In this setting we define notions of manipulation, equilibrium,…
In many decision-making scenarios, individuals strategically choose what information to disclose to optimize their own outcomes. It is unclear whether such strategic information disclosure can lead to good societal outcomes. To address this…
We study candidates' positioning when adjustments are possible in response to new information about voters' preferences. Re-positioning allows candidates to get closer to the median voter but is costly both financially and electorally. We…
In this paper, we investigate informational asymmetries in the Colonel Blotto game, a game-theoretic model of competitive resource allocation between two players over a set of battlefields. The battlefield valuations are subject to…
On information security outsourcing market, an important reason that firms do not want to let outside firms(usually called MSSPs-Managed Security Service Providers) to take care of their security need is that they worry about service…