Related papers: On the Parameterized Complexity of Controlling Ame…
Most work on manipulation assumes that all preferences are known to the manipulators. However, in many settings elections are open and sequential, and manipulators may know the already cast votes but may not know the future votes. We…
Program behavior may depend on parameters, which are either configured before compilation time, or provided at run-time, e.g., by sensors or other input devices. Parametric program analysis explores how different parameter settings may…
We consider the computational complexity of the question whether a certain strategy can be removed from a game by means of iterated elimination of dominated strategies. In particular, we study the influence of different definitions of…
Parameterization and approximation are two popular ways of coping with NP-hard problems. More recently, the two have also been combined to derive many interesting results. We survey developments in the area both from the algorithmic and…
In the Shift Bribery problem, we are given an election (based on preference orders), a preferred candidate $p$, and a budget. The goal is to ensure that $p$ wins by shifting $p$ higher in some voters' preference orders. However, each such…
We study the parameterized complexity of scheduling unit-time jobs on parallel, identical machines under generalized precedence constraints for minimization of the makespan and the sum of completion times. In our setting, each job is…
This survey is focused on certain sequential decision-making problems that involve optimizing over probability functions. We discuss the relevance of these problems for learning and control. The survey is organized around a framework that…
Electoral control models ways of changing the outcome of an election via such actions as adding/deleting/partitioning either candidates or voters. To protect elections from such control attempts, computational complexity has been…
In an election, we are given a set of voters, each having a preference list over a set of candidates, that are distributed on a social network. We consider a scenario where voters may change their preference lists as a consequence of the…
Selective rationalization has become a common mechanism to ensure that predictive models reveal how they use any available features. The selection may be soft or hard, and identifies a subset of input features relevant for prediction. The…
Much of the theoretical work on strategic voting makes strong assumptions about what voters know about the voting situation. A strategizing voter is typically assumed to know how other voters will vote and to know the rules of the voting…
The Possible-Winner problem asks, given an election where the voters' preferences over the set of candidates is partially specified, whether a distinguished candidate can become a winner. In this work, we consider the computational…
Voting is a simple mechanism to combine together the preferences of multiple agents. Agents may try to manipulate the result of voting by mis-reporting their preferences. One barrier that might exist to such manipulation is computational…
We study various novel complexity measures for two-sided matching mechanisms, applied to the two canonical strategyproof matching mechanisms, Deferred Acceptance (DA) and Top Trading Cycles (TTC). Our metrics are designed to capture the…
We study the behavior of Range Voting and Normalized Range Voting with respect to electoral control. Electoral control encompasses attempts from an election chair to alter the structure of an election in order to change the outcome. We show…
We propose models for lobbying in a probabilistic environment, in which an actor (called "The Lobby") seeks to influence voters' preferences of voting for or against multiple issues when the voters' preferences are represented in terms of…
We consider two matrix completion problems, in which we are given a matrix with missing entries and the task is to complete the matrix in a way that (1) minimizes the rank, or (2) minimizes the number of distinct rows. We study the…
In graph modification problems, one is given a graph G and the goal is to apply a minimum number of modification operations (such as edge deletions) to G such that the resulting graph fulfills a certain property. For example, the Cluster…
We study control problems in the context of matching under preferences: We examine how a central authority, called the controller, can manipulate an instance of the Stable Marriage or Stable Roommates problems in order to achieve certain…
We investigate the complexity of {\sc{Constructive Control by Adding/Deleting Votes}} (CCAV/CCDV) for $r$-approval, Condorcet, Maximin and Copeland$^{\alpha}$ in $k$-axes and $k$-candidates partition single-peaked elections. In general, we…