Related papers: Evolutionary games on the lattice: multitype conta…
We study the rock-paper-scissors game in structured populations, where the invasion rates determine individual payoffs that govern the process of strategy change. The traditional version of the game is recovered if the payoffs for each…
We introduce and analyze a purely competitive dynamics for the evolution of an infinite population subject to a 3-strategy game. We argue that this dynamics represents a characterization of how certain systems, both natural and artificial,…
Controlling evolutionary game-theoretic dynamics is a problem of paramount importance for the systems and control community, with several applications spanning from social science to engineering. Here, we study a population of individuals…
Competition among cooperators, defectors, and loners is studied in an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with optional participation. Loners are risk averse i.e. unwilling to participate and rather rely on small but fixed earnings. This…
This paper considers a natural variant of the $d$-dimensional multitype contact process in which individuals can be fertile or sterile. Fertile individuals of type $i$ give birth to an offspring of their own type at rate $\lambda_i$, the…
In this paper, we show that different types of evolutionary game dynamics are, in principle, special cases of a dynamical system model based on our previously reported framework of generalized growth transforms. The framework shows that…
We study evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations. We analyze an evolutionary process, which we call pairwise comparison, for which we adopt the ubiquitous Fermi distribution function from statistical mechanics. The inverse…
The predominant paradigm in evolutionary game theory and more generally online learning in games is based on a clear distinction between a population of dynamic agents that interact given a fixed, static game. In this paper, we move away…
The perceived risk and reward for a given situation can vary depending on resource availability, accumulated wealth, and other extrinsic factors such as individual backgrounds. Based on this general aspect of everyday life, here we use…
Various social dilemma games that follow different strategy updating rules have been studied on many networks.The reported results span the entire spectrum, from significantly boosting,to marginally affecting,to seriously decreasing the…
Uncertainty, characterised by randomness and stochasticity, is ubiquitous in applications of evolutionary game theory across various fields, including biology, economics and social sciences. The uncertainty may arise from various sources…
In this paper, we study the number of equilibria of the replicator-mutator dynamics for both deterministic and random multi-player two-strategy evolutionary games. For deterministic games, using Decartes' rule of signs, we provide a formula…
This paper studies the rationalization and identification of binary games where players have correlated private types. Allowing for correlation is crucial in global games and in models with social interactions as it represents correlated…
Evolutionary dynamics can be studied in well-mixed or structured populations. Population structure typically arises from the heterogeneous distribution of individuals in physical space or on social networks. Here we introduce a new type of…
The serious games between humans and AI have only just begun. Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) models the competitive and cooperative strategies of biological entities. EGT could help predict the potential evolutionary equilibrium of humans…
A mathematical model for behavioral changes by pair interactions (i.e. due to direct contact) of individuals is developed. Three kinds of pair interactions can be distinguished: Imitative processes, avoidance processes, and compromising…
This paper analyzes the relationships between demographic and state-based evolutionary games and Hamilton's rule. It is shown that the classical Hamilton's rule (counterfactual method), combined with demographic payoffs, leads to easily…
It is known that learning of players who interact in a repeated game can be interpreted as an evolutionary process in a population of ideas. These analogies have so far mostly been established in deterministic models, and memory loss in…
Understanding the evolution of human social systems requires flexible formalisms for the emergence of institutions. Although game theory is normally used to model interactions individually, larger spaces of games can be helpful for modeling…
The psychology of the individual is continuously changing in nature, which has a significant influence on the evolutionary dynamics of populations. To study the influence of the continuously changing psychology of individuals on the…