Related papers: Robust Equilibria in Generic Extensive form Games

We study multi-player games with perfect information and general payoff function, where the set of stages is the set of non-positive integers $\{\ldots,-2,-1,0\}$. We define two related equilibrium concepts: one considering only deviations…

We study equilibrium concepts in non-cooperative games under uncertainty where both beliefs and mixed strategies are represented by non-additive measures (capacities). In contrast to the classical Nash framework based on additive…

Animal behavior and evolution can often be described by game-theoretic models. Although in many situations, the number of players is very large, their strategic interactions are usually decomposed into a sum of two-player games. Only…

We present a new model of incomplete information games without private information in which the players use a distributionally robust optimization approach to cope with the payoff uncertainty. With some specific restrictions, we show that…

We consider 2-player stochastic games with perfectly observed actions, and study the limit, as the discount factor goes to one, of the equilibrium payoffs set. In the usual setup where current states are observed by the players, we show…

While Nash equilibrium in extensive-form games is well understood, very little is known about the properties of extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE), both from a behavioral and from a computational point of view. In this setting,…

The concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), introduced by Smith and Price, is a refinement of Nash equilibrium in 2-player symmetric games in order to explain counter-intuitive natural phenomena, whose existence is not…

We present a unified framework for characterizing local Nash equilibria in continuous games on either infinite-dimensional or finite-dimensional non-convex strategy spaces. We provide intrinsic necessary and sufficient first- and…

We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…

In Stackelberg v/s Stackelberg games a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium problems are plagued by the nonuniqueness of…

In a finite two player game consider the matrix of one player's payoff difference between any two consecutive pure strategies. Define the half space induced by a column vector of this matrix as the set of vectors that form an obtuse angle…

We propose efficient no-regret learning dynamics and ellipsoid-based methods for computing linear correlated equilibria$\unicode{x2014}$a relaxation of correlated equilibria and a strengthening of coarse correlated…

We characterize Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games. Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies the following axioms: (i) strictly dominant actions are played with positive probability,…

The two-players N strategies games quantized according to the Eisert-Lewenstein-Wilkens scheme [1] are considered. It is shown that in the case of maximal entanglement no nontrivial pure Nash equilibrium exists. The proof relies on simple…

We investigate the complexity of bounding the uncertainty of graphical games, and we provide new insight into the intrinsic difficulty of computing Nash equilibria. In particular, we show that, if one adds very simple and natural additional…

This paper studies n-player games where players beliefs about their opponents behaviour are capacities (fuzzy measures, non-additive probabilities). The concept of an equilibrium under uncertainty was introduced by J.Dow and S.Werlang…

We consider a nonlinear autonomous system of $N\gg 1$ degrees of freedom randomly coupled by both relaxational ('gradient') and non-relaxational ('solenoidal') random interactions. We show that with increased interaction strength such…

The existence of simple uncoupled no-regret learning dynamics that converge to correlated equilibria in normal-form games is a celebrated result in the theory of multi-agent systems. Specifically, it has been known for more than 20 years…

The proper equilibrium, introduced by Myerson (1978), is a classic refinement of the Nash equilibrium that has been referred to as the "mother of all refinements." For normal-form games, computing a proper equilibrium is known to be…

In many settings where multiple agents interact, the optimal choices for each agent depend heavily on the choices of the others. These coupled interactions are well-described by a general-sum differential game, in which players have…