Related papers: Broker-Trader Partial Information Nash-Equilibria
Studying games in the complete information model makes them analytically tractable. However, large $n$ player interactions are more realistically modeled as games of incomplete information, where players may know little to nothing about the…
In non-truthful auctions such as first-price and all-pay auctions, the independent strategic behaviors of bidders, with the corresponding Bayes-Nash equilibrium notion, are notoriously difficult to characterize and can cause undesirable…
This paper considers a two-player game where each player chooses a resource from a finite collection of options. Each resource brings a random reward. Both players have statistical information regarding the rewards of each resource.…
We introduce a microscopic model of interacting financial agents, where each agent is characterized by two portfolios; money invested in bonds and money invested in stocks. Furthermore, each agent is faced with an optimization problem in…
The Glosten-Milgrom model describes a single asset market, where informed traders interact with a market maker, in the presence of noise traders. We derive an analogy between this financial model and a Szil\'ard information engine by {\em…
The distributed computation of Nash equilibria is assuming growing relevance in engineering where such problems emerge in the context of distributed control. Accordingly, we present schemes for computing equilibria of two classes of static…
In this work, we investigate the distributed generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) seeking problems for $N$-coalition games with inequality constraints. First, we study the scenario where each agent in a coalition has full information of all…
The possibility of latency arbitrage in financial markets has led to the deployment of high-speed communication links between distant financial centers. These links are noisy and so there is a need for coding. In this paper, we develop a…
We consider in discrete time, a general class of sequential stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information with the following features. The underlying system has Markovian dynamics controlled by the agents' joint actions. Each agent's…
We study a simple model of an asset market with informed and non-informed agents. In the absence of non-informed agents, the market becomes information efficient when the number of traders with different private information is large enough.…
Inspired by the recent work by Shapiro et al. [45], we propose a Bayesian distributionally robust Nash equilibrium (BDRNE) model where each player lacks complete information on the true probability distribution of the underlying uncertainty…
The distribution of efficient individuals in the economy and the efforts that they will put in if they are hired, there are two important concerns for a technologically advanced firm. wants to open a new branch. The firm does not have…
Our paper concerns the computation of Nash equilibria of first-price auctions with correlated values. While there exist several equilibrium computation methods for auctions with independent values, the correlation of the bidders' values…
We study the distribution of strategies in a large game that models how agents choose among different double auction markets. We classify the possible mean field Nash equilibria, which include potentially segregated states where an agent…
We study a full implementation problem with a state unknown to the designer but known to agents, where agents have uncertain evidence privately drawn from state-dependent distributions. Stochastic evidence enables ``perfect deceptions,''…
In this paper we formulate and study an optimal switching problem under partial information. In our model the agent/manager/investor attempts to maximize the expected reward by switching between different states/investments. However, he is…
A seller offers an asset in a decentralised market. Buyers have private signals about their common value. I study whether the market becomes allocatively more efficient with (i) more buyers, (ii) better-informed buyers. Both increase the…
Robots navigating in crowded areas should negotiate free space with humans rather than fully controlling collision avoidance, as this can lead to freezing behavior. Game theory provides a framework for the robot to reason about potential…
In this paper, we consider a distributed Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) seeking problem in incomplete-information aggregative games, which is a generalization of Bayesian games and deterministic aggregative games. We handle the aggregation…
We consider the computational complexity of computing Bayes-Nash equilibria in first-price auctions, where the bidders' values for the item are drawn from a general (possibly correlated) joint distribution. We show that when the values and…