Related papers: Matching Markets with Chores
We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods, among agents, under cardinality constraints and additive valuations. In this setting, we are given a partition of the entire set of goods---i.e., the goods are…
We study fair mechanisms for the classic job scheduling problem on unrelated machines with the objective of minimizing the makespan. This problem is equivalent to minimizing the egalitarian social cost in the fair division of chores. The…
We consider a fair division setting where indivisible items are allocated to agents. Each agent in the setting has strictly negative, zero or strictly positive utility for each item. We, thus, make a distinction between items that are good…
The fair allocation of mixed goods, consisting of both divisible and indivisible goods, has been a prominent topic of study in economics and computer science. We define an allocation as fair if its utility vector minimizes a symmetric…
Allocating conflicting jobs among individuals while respecting a budget constraint for each individual is an optimization problem that arises in various real-world scenarios. In this paper, we consider the situation where each individual…
We study the problem of fair division when the resources contain both divisible and indivisible goods. Classic fairness notions such as envy-freeness (EF) and envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) cannot be directly applied to the mixed goods…
We study linear Fisher markets with satiation. In these markets, sellers have earning limits and buyers have utility limits. Beyond natural applications in economics, these markets arise in the context of maximizing Nash social welfare when…
We study a matching problem between agents and public goods, in settings without monetary transfers. Since goods are public, they have no capacity constraints. There is no exogenously defined budget of goods to be provided. Rather, each…
Within the relatively busy area of fair machine learning that has been dominated by classification fairness research, fairness in clustering has started to see some recent attention. In this position paper, we assess the existing work in…
We initiate the study of fair distribution of delivery tasks among a set of agents wherein delivery jobs are placed along the vertices of a graph. Our goal is to fairly distribute delivery costs (modeled as a submodular function) among a…
One of the most important topics in discrete fair division is whether an EFX allocation exists for any instance. Although the existence of EFX allocations is a standing open problem for both goods and chores, the understanding of the…
Fair machine learning is receiving an increasing attention in machine learning fields. Researchers in fair learning have developed correlation or association-based measures such as demographic disparity, mistreatment disparity, calibration,…
In fair division, equitability dictates that each participant receives the same level of utility. In this work, we study equitable allocations of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. While prior work has studied…
In this paper, we study how to fairly allocate m indivisible chores to n (asymmetric) agents. We consider (weighted) proportionality up to any item (PROPX) and show that a (weighted) PROPX allocation always exists and can be computed…
Metric search commonly involves finding objects similar to a given sample object. We explore a generalization, where the desired result is a fair tradeoff between multiple query objects. This builds on previous results on complex queries,…
We extend the fair machine learning literature by considering the problem of proportional centroid clustering in a metric context. For clustering $n$ points with $k$ centers, we define fairness as proportionality to mean that any $n/k$…
A mixed manna contains goods (that everyone likes), bads (that everyone dislikes), as well as items that are goods to some agents, but bads or satiated to others. If all items are goods and utility functions are homothetic, concave (and…
We study the fair allocation of indivisible items under relevance constraints, where each agent has a set of relevant items and can only receive items that are relevant to them. While the relevance constraint has been studied in recent…
We study markets of indivisible items in which price-based (Walrasian) equilibria often do not exist due to the discrete non-convex setting. Instead we consider Nash equilibria of the market viewed as a game, where players bid for items,…
This paper continues the study, initiated by Cole and Fleischer, of the behavior of a tatonnement price update rule in Ongoing Fisher Markets. The prior work showed fast convergence toward an equilibrium when the goods satisfied the weak…