Related papers: Characterising Simulation-Based Program Equilibria

In general, Nash equilibria in normal-form games may require players to play (probabilistically) mixed strategies. We define a measure of the complexity of finite probability distributions and study the complexity required to play Nash…

Observable games are game situations that reach one of possibly many Nash equilibria. Before an instance of the game starts, an external observer does not know, a priori, what is the exact profile of actions that will occur; thus, he…

Dynamic nonzero sum games are widely used to model multi agent decision making in control, economics, and related fields. Classical methods for computing Nash equilibria, especially in linear quadratic settings, rely on strong structural…

A multi-agent system operates in an uncertain environment about which agents have different and time varying beliefs that, as time progresses, converge to a common belief. A global utility function that depends on the realized state of the…

While games have been used extensively as milestones to evaluate game-playing AI, there exists no standardised framework for reporting the obtained observations. As a result, it remains difficult to draw general conclusions about the…

While AI systems have equaled or surpassed human performance in a wide variety of games such as Chess, Go, or Dota 2, describing these systems as truly "human-like" remains far-fetched. Despite their success, they fail to replicate the…

Normal-form two-player games are categorized by players into K analogy classes so as to minimize the prediction error about the behavior of the opponent. This results in Clustered Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibria in which strategies are…

Strategic interactions can be represented more concisely, and analyzed and solved more efficiently, if we are aware of the symmetries within the multiagent system. Symmetries also have conceptual implications, for example for equilibrium…

We study mean field games and corresponding $N$-player games in continuous time over a finite time horizon where the position of each agent belongs to a finite state space. As opposed to previous works on finite state mean field games, we…

Stackelberg equilibria have become increasingly important as a solution concept in computational game theory, largely inspired by practical problems such as security settings. In practice, however, there is typically uncertainty regarding…

This paper proposes a dynamic game formulation for cooperative human-robot navigation in shared workspaces with obstacles, where the human and robot jointly satisfy shared safety constraints while pursuing a common task. A key contribution…

We tackle the problem of learning equilibria in simulation-based games. In such games, the players' utility functions cannot be described analytically, as they are given through a black-box simulator that can be queried to obtain noisy…

For two-person dynamic zero-sum games (both discrete and continuous settings), we investigate the limit of value functions of finite horizon games with long run average cost as the time horizon tends to infinity and the limit of value…

The problem of computing a common point that lies in the intersection of a finite number of closed convex sets, each known to one agent in a network, is studied. This issue, known as the distributed convex feasibility problem or the…

Many emerging problems involve teams of agents taking part in a game. Such problems require a stochastic analysis with regard to the correlation structures among the agents belonging to a given team. In the context of Standard Borel spaces,…

This paper studies two-player zero-sum repeated Bayesian games in which every player has a private type that is unknown to the other player, and the initial probability of the type of every player is publicly known. The types of players are…

This work lies in the fusion of experimental economics and data mining. It continues author's previous work on mining behaviour rules of human subjects from experimental data, where game-theoretic predictions partially fail to work.…

In this note, we prove the existence of an equilibrium concept, dubbed conditional strategy equilibrium, for non-cooperative games in which a strategy of a player is a function from the other players' actions to her own actions. We study…

In repeated games, strategies are often evaluated by their ability to guarantee the performance of the single best action that is selected in hindsight, a property referred to as \emph{Hannan consistency}, or \emph{no-regret}. However, the…

Coding theory revolves around the incorporation of redundancy into transmitted symbols, computation tasks, and stored data to guard against adversarial manipulation. However, error correction in coding theory is contingent upon a strict…