Related papers: Characterising Simulation-Based Program Equilibria

Bell-inequality violations establish that two systems share some quantum entanglement. We give a simple test to certify that two systems share an asymptotically large amount of entanglement, n EPR states. The test is efficient: unlike…

We study discounted infinitely repeated games in which players agree on a cooperative mixed action profile but, at each step, observe only the realized pure actions. This form of imperfect monitoring breaks classical trigger strategies,…

This paper is concerned with two-person dynamic zero-sum games. Let games for some family have common dynamics, running costs and capabilities of players, and let these games differ in densities only. We show that the Dynamic Programming…

Adaptive machines have the potential to assist or interfere with human behavior in a range of contexts, from cognitive decision-making to physical device assistance. Therefore it is critical to understand how machine learning algorithms can…

We consider two classes of constrained finite state-action stochastic games. First, we consider a two player nonzero sum single controller constrained stochastic game with both average and discounted cost criterion. We consider the same…

The peculiarity of adversarial team games resides in the asymmetric information available to the team members during the play, which makes the equilibrium computation problem hard even with zero-sum payoffs. The algorithms available in the…

This work introduces a unified framework for analyzing games in greater depth. In the existing literature, players' strategies are typically assigned scalar values, and equilibrium concepts are used to identify compatible choices. However,…

We consider shared workspace scenarios with humans and robots acting to achieve independent goals, termed as parallel play. We model these as general-sum games and construct a framework that utilizes the Nash equilibrium solution concept to…

We study the computation of equilibria in prediction markets in perhaps the most fundamental special case with two players and three trading opportunities. To do so, we show equivalence of prediction market equilibria with those of a…

We study N-player finite games with costs perturbed due to time-varying disturbances in the underlying system and to that end, we propose the concept of Robust Correlated Equilibrium that generalizes the definition of Correlated…

We study strategic interaction in data-driven games where players face uncertainty about payoff distributions inferred from finite samples. To model calibrated attitudes toward such uncertainty, we formulate distributionally robust games…

A game has approximate equilibria if for every $\epsilon >0$ there is an $\epsilon$-equilibrium. We show that there is a stochastic game that lacks approximate equilibria. This game has finitely many players and actions, their payoffs are…

Entangled quantum systems can exhibit correlations that cannot be simulated classically. For historical reasons such correlations are called "Bell inequality violations." We give two new two-player games with Bell inequality violations that…

We study the problem of finding robust equilibria in multiplayer concurrent games with mean payoff objectives. A $(k,t)$-robust equilibrium is a strategy profile such that no coalition of size $k$ can improve the payoff of one its member by…

A general model for zero-sum stochastic games with asymmetric information is considered. In this model, each player's information at each time can be divided into a common information part and a private information part. Under certain…

Aligning AI systems with human values remains a fundamental challenge, but does our inability to create perfectly aligned models preclude obtaining the benefits of alignment? We study a strategic setting where a human user interacts with…

Usually, to apply game-theoretic methods, we must specify utilities precisely, and we run the risk that the solutions we compute are not robust to errors in this specification. Ordinal games provide an attractive alternative: they require…

We study the complexity of computing equilibria in two classes of network games based on flows - fractional BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) games and fractional BBC (Bounded Budget Connection) games. BGP is the glue that holds the Internet…

It is frequently suggested that predictions made by game theory could be improved by considering computational restrictions when modeling agents. Under the supposition that players in a game may desire to balance maximization of payoff with…

We present a polynomial-time algorithm that always finds an (approximate) Nash equilibrium for repeated two-player stochastic games. The algorithm exploits the folk theorem to derive a strategy profile that forms an equilibrium by…