Related papers: Characterising Simulation-Based Program Equilibria
To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…
It is increasingly possible for real-world agents, such as software-based agents or human institutions, to view the internal programming of other such agents that they interact with. For instance, a company can read the bylaws of another…
Correlated equilibria -- and their generalization $\Phi$-equilibria -- are a fundamental object of study in game theory, offering a more tractable alternative to Nash equilibria in multi-player settings. While computational aspects of…
When a prediction algorithm serves a collection of users, disparities in prediction quality are likely to emerge. If users respond to accurate predictions by increasing engagement, inviting friends, or adopting trends, repeated learning…
Population protocols have been introduced by Angluin et {al.} as a model of networks consisting of very limited mobile agents that interact in pairs but with no control over their own movement. A collection of anonymous agents, modeled by…
We propose a distributed algorithm to compute an equilibrium in aggregate games where players communicate over a fixed undirected network. Our algorithm exploits correlated perturbation to obfuscate information shared over the network. We…
We study the problem of finding Stackelberg equilibria in games with a massive number of players. So far, the only known game instances in which the problem is solved in polynomial time are some particular congestion games. However, a…
This paper provides theoretical bounds for empirical game theoretical analysis of complex multi-agent interactions. We provide insights in the empirical meta game showing that a Nash equilibrium of the meta-game is an approximate Nash…
In decision-dependent games, multiple players optimize their decisions under a data distribution that shifts with their joint actions, creating complex dynamics in applications like market pricing. A practical consequence of these dynamics…
We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…
The paper is concerned with distributed learning in large-scale games. The well-known fictitious play (FP) algorithm is addressed, which, despite theoretical convergence results, might be impractical to implement in large-scale settings due…
We consider a setting in which a principal gets to choose which game from some given set is played by a group of agents. The principal would like to choose a game that favors one of the players, the social preferences of the players, or the…
While we would like agents that can coordinate with humans, current algorithms such as self-play and population-based training create agents that can coordinate with themselves. Agents that assume their partner to be optimal or similar to…
Establishing the existence of Nash equilibria for partially observed stochastic dynamic games is known to be quite challenging, with the difficulties stemming from the noisy nature of the measurements available to individual players…
Game-theoretic interactions with AI agents could differ from traditional human-human interactions in various ways. One such difference is that it may be possible to simulate an AI agent (for example because its source code is known), which…
Decentralized team problems where players have asymmetric information about the state of the underlying stochastic system have been actively studied, but \emph{games} between such teams are less understood. We consider a general model of…
The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their…
We introduce a set-valued solution concept, M equilibrium, to capture empirical regularities from over half a century of game-theory experiments. We show M equilibrium serves as a meta theory for various models that hitherto were considered…
Game theoretic equilibria are mathematical expressions of rationality. Rational agents are used to model not only humans and their software representatives, but also organisms, populations, species and genes, interacting with each other and…
We extend the construction of equilibria for linear-quadratic and mean-variance portfolio problems available in the literature to a large class of mean-field time-inconsistent stochastic control problems in continuous time. Our approach…