Related papers: On Monotone Persuasion
We study the algorithmics of information structure design -- a.k.a. persuasion or signaling -- in a fundamental special case introduced by Arieli and Babichenko: multiple agents, binary actions, and no inter-agent externalities. Unlike…
We consider a largely untapped potential for the improvement of traffic networks that is rooted in the inherent uncertainty of travel times. Travel times are subject to stochastic uncertainty resulting from various parameters such as…
We study finite-state communication games in which the sender's preference is perturbed by random private idiosyncrasies. Persuasion is generically impossible within the class of statistically independent sender/receiver preferences --…
A distributed average consensus algorithm in which every sensor transmits with bounded peak power is proposed. In the presence of communication noise, it is shown that the nodes reach consensus asymptotically to a finite random variable…
We study an extended system that without noise shows a spatially homogeneous state, but when submitted to an adequate multiplicative noise, some "noise-induced patterns" arise. The stochastic resonance between these structures is…
This paper introduces a novel criterion, persuasiveness, to select equilibria in signaling games. In response to the Stiglitz critique, persuasiveness focuses on the comparison across equilibria. An equilibrium is more persuasive than an…
A sender persuades a strategically naive decisionmaker (DM) by committing privately to an experiment. Sender's choice of experiment is unknown to the DM, who must form her posterior beliefs nonparametrically by applying some learning rule…
A designer relies on an experimenter to provide information to a decision maker, but the experimenter has incentives to persuade rather than merely transmit information. Anticipating this motive, the designer can restrict the set of…
We study a regularized variant of the Bayesian Persuasion problem, where the receiver's decision process includes a divergence-based penalty that accounts for deviations from perfect rationality. This modification smooths the underlying…
We study a class of two-sided optimal control problems of general linear diffusions under a so-called Poisson constraint: the controlling is only allowed at the arrival times of an independent Poisson signal processes. We give a weak and…
This paper considers a sequential estimation and sensor scheduling problem in the presence of multiple communication channels. As opposed to the classical remote estimation problem that involves one perfect (noiseless) channel and one…
In this second part of our two-part paper, we invoke the stochastic maximum principle, conditional Hamiltonian and the coupled backward-forward stochastic differential equations of the first part [1] to derive team optimal decentralized…
In the persuasion model, apart from a few special cases, comparative statics has been an open question. We answer it, delineating which shifts of the sender's interim payoff lead her optimally to choose a more informative signal. Our first…
This paper considers a sequential sensor scheduling and remote estimation problem with multiple communication channels. Departing from the classical remote estimation paradigm, which involves one communication channel (noiseless or noisy),…
This paper provides a unified framework for analyzing tensor estimation problems that allow for nonlinear observations, heteroskedastic noise, and covariate information. We study a general class of high-dimensional models where each…
We consider the design of a linear sensing system with a fixed energy budget assuming that the sampling noise is the dominant noise source. The energy constraint implies that the signal energy per measurement decreases linearly with the…
An informed sender communicates with an uninformed receiver through a sequence of uninformed mediators; agents' utilities depend on receiver's action and the state. For any number of mediators, the sender's optimal value is characterized.…
This paper studies the question of how well a signal can be reprsented by a sparse linear combination of reference signals from an overcomplete dictionary. When the dictionary size is exponential in the dimension of signal, then the exact…
We study multidimensional signaling (cognitive/non-cognitive) as a sender's portfolio choice with a resource constraint. We establish the existence of a unique monotone D1 equilibrium where the cognitive (non-cognitive) signal increases…
How should an agent (the sender) observing multi-dimensional data (the state vector) persuade another agent to take the desired action? We show that it is always optimal for the sender to perform a (non-linear) dimension reduction by…