Related papers: Equilibrium Computation in the Hotelling-Downs Mod…

In the traditional voting manipulation literature, it is assumed that a group of manipulators jointly misrepresent their preferences to get a certain candidate elected, while the remaining voters are truthful. In this paper, we depart from…

Probabilistic model checking for stochastic games enables formal verification of systems that comprise competing or collaborating entities operating in a stochastic environment. Despite good progress in the area, existing approaches focus…

The classical Hotelling game is played on a line segment whose points represent uniformly distributed clients. The $n$ players of the game are servers who need to place themselves on the line segment, and once this is done, each client gets…

The concept of leader--follower (or Stackelberg) equilibrium plays a central role in a number of real--world applications of game theory. While the case with a single follower has been thoroughly investigated, results with multiple…

Competing firms tend to select similar locations for their stores. This phenomenon, called the principle of minimum differentiation, was captured by Hotelling with a landmark model of spatial competition but is still the object of an…

In this paper, we consider the competitive diffusion game, and study the existence of its pure-strategy Nash equilibrium when defined over general undirected networks. We first determine the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria for two…

The Nash equilibrium is an important benchmark for behaviour in systems of strategic autonomous agents. Polymatrix games are a succinct and expressive representation of multiplayer games that model pairwise interactions between players. The…

In this paper, we aim to design a distributed approximate algorithm for seeking Nash equilibria of an aggregative game. Due to the local set constraints of each player, projectionbased algorithms have been widely employed for solving such…

Dynamic nonzero sum games are widely used to model multi agent decision making in control, economics, and related fields. Classical methods for computing Nash equilibria, especially in linear quadratic settings, rely on strong structural…

We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent optimizes its convex cost function subject to individual and coupling constraints. The constraint sets are compact convex subsets of a Euclidean space. To learn Nash equilibria, we…

Sequential allocation is a simple mechanism for sharing multiple indivisible items. We study strategic behavior in sequential allocation. In particular, we consider Nash dynamics, as well as the computation and Pareto optimality of pure…

In this paper, we address the challenge of Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking in non-cooperative convex games with partial-decision information. We propose a distributed algorithm, where each agent refines its strategy through projected-gradient…

This work proposes a novel distributed approach for computing a Nash equilibrium in convex games with merely monotone and restricted strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. By leveraging the idea of the centralized operator extrapolation method…

Nash equilibrium is a central concept in game theory. Several Nash solvers exist, yet none scale to normal-form games with many actions and many players, especially those with payoff tensors too big to be stored in memory. In this work, we…

Reinforcement learning from self-play has recently reported many successes. Self-play, where the agents compete with themselves, is often used to generate training data for iterative policy improvement. In previous work, heuristic rules are…

A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…

We address Nash equilibrium problems in a partial-decision information scenario, where each agent can only exchange information with some neighbors, while its cost function possibly depends on the strategies of all agents. We characterize…

Consider an important meeting to be held in a team-based organization. Taking availability constraints into account, an online scheduling poll is being used in order to decide upon the exact time of the meeting. Decisions are to be taken…

This work proposes a novel distributed approach for computing a Nash equilibrium in convex games with restricted strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. By leveraging the idea of the centralized operator extrapolation method presented in [4] to…

We study a general scenario of simultaneous contests that allocate prizes based on equal sharing: each contest awards its prize to all players who satisfy some contest-specific criterion, and the value of this prize to a winner decreases as…