Related papers: Bi-Criteria Metric Distortion
In the context of single-winner ranked-choice elections between $m$ candidates, we explore the tradeoff between two competing goals in every democratic system: the majority principle (maximizing the social welfare) and the minority…
The notion of distortion in social choice problems has been defined to measure the loss in efficiency -- typically measured by the utilitarian social welfare, the sum of utilities of the participating agents -- due to having access only to…
We study electoral campaign management scenarios in which an external party can buy votes, i.e., pay the voters to promote its preferred candidate in their preference rankings. The external party's goal is to make its preferred candidate a…
Polarization is a major concern for a well-functioning society. Often, mass polarization of a society is driven by polarizing political representation, even when the latter is easily preventable. The existing computational social choice…
We introduce and study isomorphic distances between ordinal elections (with the same numbers of candidates and voters). The main feature of these distances is that they are invariant to renaming the candidates and voters, and two elections…
In the online metric matching problem, $n$ servers and $n$ requests lie in a metric space. Servers are available upfront, and requests arrive sequentially. An arriving request must be matched immediately and irrevocably to an available…
Studying complexity of various bribery problems has been one of the main research focus in computational social choice. In all the models of bribery studied so far, the briber has to pay every voter some amount of money depending on what…
Recent works have studied the design of algorithms for selecting representative sortition panels. However, the most central question remains unaddressed: Do these panels reflect the entire population's opinion? We present a positive answer…
We study social choice mechanisms in an implicit utilitarian framework with a metric constraint, where the goal is to minimize \textit{Distortion}, the worst case social cost of an ordinal mechanism relative to underlying cardinal…
We consider a setting with agents that have preferences over alternatives and are partitioned into disjoint districts. The goal is to choose one alternative as the winner using a mechanism which first decides a representative alternative…
We study a version of the metric facility location problem (or, equivalently, variants of the committee selection problem) in which we must choose $k$ facilities in an arbitrary metric space to serve some set of clients $C$. We consider…
We study the complexity of (approximate) winner determination under the Monroe and Chamberlin--Courant multiwinner voting rules, which determine the set of representatives by optimizing the total (dis)satisfaction of the voters with their…
Aggregating the preferences of individuals into a collective decision is the core subject of study of social choice theory. In 2006, Procaccia and Rosenschein considered a utilitarian social choice setting, where the agents have explicit…
Most social choice rules assume access to full rankings, while current alignment practice -- despite aiming for diversity -- typically treats voters as anonymous and comparisons as independent, effectively extracting only about one bit per…
We consider the one-sided matching problem, where n agents have preferences over n items, and these preferences are induced by underlying cardinal valuation functions. The goal is to match every agent to a single item so as to maximize the…
In computational social choice, the distortion of a voting rule quantifies the degree to which the rule overcomes limited preference information to select a socially desirable outcome. This concept has been investigated extensively, but…
We study the complexity of determining a winning committee under the Chamberlin--Courant voting rule when voters' preferences are single-crossing on a line, or, more generally, on a median graph (this class of graphs includes, e.g., trees…
In approval-based multiwinner voting, voters express approval preferences over a set of candidates, and the goal is to return a winning committee. This model captures a broad range of subset selection problems under preferences. Prior work…
We study the problem of selecting a representative committee of $k$ agents from a collection of $n$ agents in a common metric space. This problem is related to choosing $k$ facilities in facility location and $k$-median problems. However,…
In machine learning, metric elicitation refers to the selection of performance metrics that best reflect an individual's implicit preferences for a given application. Currently, metric elicitation methods only consider metrics that depend…