Related papers: Efficient and Verified Continuous Double Auctions
We present an algorithm for computing pure-strategy epsilon-perfect Bayesian equilibria in sequential auctions with continuous action and value spaces. Importantly, our algorithm includes a verification phase that computes an upper bound on…
Flaws of a continuous limit order book mechanism raise the question of whether a continuous trading session and a periodic auction session would bring better efficiency. This paper wants to go further in designing a periodic auction when…
Reasoning about real number expressions in a proof assistant is challenging. Several problems in theorem proving can be solved by using exact real number computation. I have implemented a library for reasoning and computing with complete…
VQ (Vendor Qualification) and IOQ (Installation and Operation Qualification) audits are implemented in warehouses to ensure all equipment being turned over in the fulfillment network meets the quality standards. Audit checks are likely to…
We propose an efficient protocol for secure comparison of integers when both integers are shared between two parties. Such protocols are useful for implementing secure auctions. The proposed protocol's computational complexity is roughly…
In order to increase user confidence, many automated theorem provers provide certificates that can be independently verified. In this paper, we report on our progress in developing a standalone tool for checking the correctness of…
Proof assistants are getting more widespread use in research and industry to provide certified and independently checkable guarantees about theories, designs, systems and implementations. However, proof assistant implementations themselves…
We consider the problem of building up trust in a network of online auctions by software agents. This requires agents to have a deeper understanding of auction mechanisms and be able to verify desirable properties of a given mechanism. We…
Recurring auctions are ubiquitous for selling durable assets like artworks and homes, with follow-up auctions held for unsold items. We investigate such auctions theoretically and empirically. Theoretical analysis demonstrates that…
In mathematics, it is common practice to have several constructions for the same objects. Mathematicians will identify them modulo isomorphism and will not worry later on which construction they use, as theorems proved for one construction…
While the use of formal verification techniques is well established in the development of mission-critical software, it is still rare in the production of most other kinds of software. We share our experience that a formal verification tool…
This article introduces a fully automated verification technique that permits to analyze real-time systems described using a continuous notion of time and a mixture of operational (i.e., automata-based) and descriptive (i.e., logic-based)…
We study the bilateral trade problem: one seller, one buyer and a single, indivisible item for sale. It is well known that there is no fully-efficient and incentive compatible mechanism for this problem that maintains a balanced budget. We…
Auctions play an important role in electronic commerce, and have been used to solve problems in distributed computing. Automated approaches to designing effective auction mechanisms are helpful in reducing the burden of traditional game…
Auto2 is a recently introduced prover for the proof assistant Isabelle. It is designed to be both highly customizable from within Isabelle, and also have a powerful proof search mechanism. In this paper, we apply auto2 to the verification…
In this article we consider combinatorial markets with valuations only for singletons and pairs of buy/sell-orders for swapping two items in equal quantity. We provide an algorithm that permits polynomial time market-clearing and -pricing.…
Proving correctness of distributed or concurrent algorithms is a mind-challenging and complex process. Slight errors in the reasoning are difficult to find, calling for computer-checked proof systems. In order to build computer-checked…
Auction data often contain information on only the most competitive bids as opposed to all bids. The usual measurement error approaches to unobserved heterogeneity are inapplicable due to dependence among order statistics. We bridge this…
How does one verify that the output of a complicated program is correct? One can formally prove that the program is correct, but this may be beyond the power of existing methods. Alternatively one can check that the output produced for a…
This paper develops algorithms to solve strong-substitutes product-mix auctions. That is, it finds competitive equilibrium prices and quantities for agents who use this auction's bidding language to truthfully express their…