Related papers: A special balancing game, Victor Grinberg's questi…

We introduce a new non-zero-sum game of optimal stopping with asymmetric exercise opportunities. Given a stochastic process modelling the value of an asset, one player observes and can act on the process continuously, while the other player…

This paper introduces a novel criterion, persuasiveness, to select equilibria in signaling games. In response to the Stiglitz critique, persuasiveness focuses on the comparison across equilibria. An equilibrium is more persuasive than an…

We study parity games in which one of the two players controls only a small number $k$ of nodes and the other player controls the $n-k$ other nodes of the game. Our main result is a fixed-parameter algorithm that solves bipartite parity…

Mean-payoff games play a central role in quantitative synthesis and verification. In a single-dimensional game a weight is assigned to every transition and the objective of the protagonist is to assure a non-negative limit-average weight.…

The paper studies one-shot two-player games with non-Bayesian uncertainty. The players have an attitude that ranges from optimism to pessimism in the face of uncertainty. Given the attitudes, each player forms a belief about the set of…

Zeckendorf proved that every positive integer $n$ can be written uniquely as the sum of non-adjacent Fibonacci numbers. We use this to create a two-player game. Given a fixed integer $n$ and an initial decomposition of $n = n F_1$, the two…

We study the problem of finding robust equilibria in multiplayer concurrent games with mean payoff objectives. A $(k,t)$-robust equilibrium is a strategy profile such that no coalition of size $k$ can improve the payoff of one its member by…

The Lipschitz constant of a finite normal-form game is the maximal change in some player's payoff when a single opponent changes his strategy. We prove that games with small Lipschitz constant admit pure {\epsilon}-equilibria, and pinpoint…

Bundle adjustment is the common way to solve localization and mapping. It is an iterative process in which a system of non-linear equations is solved using two optimization methods, weighted by a damping factor. In the classic approach, the…

We study a robust Dynkin game over a set of mutually singular probabilities. We first prove that for the conservative player of the game, her lower and upper value processes coincide (i.e. She has a value process $V $ in the game). Such a…

Strategic interactions often take place in an environment rife with uncertainty. As a result, the equilibrium of a game is intimately related to the information available to its players. The \emph{signaling problem} abstracts the task faced…

In this article we revise the football's performance score called PlayeRank, designed and evaluated by Pappalardo et al.\ in 2019. First, we analyze the weights extracted from the Linear Support Vector Machine (SVM) that solves the…

By resorting to the vector space structure of finite games, skew-symmetric games (SSGs) are proposed and investigated as a natural subspace of finite games. First of all, for two player games, it is shown that the skew-symmetric games form…

We analyze the Gambler's problem, a simple reinforcement learning problem where the gambler has the chance to double or lose the bets until the target is reached. This is an early example introduced in the reinforcement learning textbook by…

We consider a simple simultaneous first price auction for multiple items in a complete information setting. Our goal is to completely characterize the mixed equilibria in this setting, for a simple, yet highly interesting, {\tt AND}-{\tt…

We analyze a zero-sum stochastic differential game between two competing players who can choose unbounded controls. The payoffs of the game are defined through backward stochastic differential equations. We prove that each player's priority…

This paper proposes a new lens for studying threshold games played on networks when the thresholds are heterogeneous. These are games where agents have two possible actions, and prefer action 1 if and only if enough of their neighbours…

We investigate a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game in which one of the players has more information on the game than his opponent. We show how to construct numerical schemes for the value function of this game, which is given…

We study a zero-sum game where the evolution of a spectrally one-sided Levy process is modified by a singular controller and is terminated by the stopper. The singular controller minimizes the expected values of running, controlling and…

We consider 2-players, 2-values minimization games where the players' costs take on two values, $a,b$, $a<b$. The players play mixed strategies and their costs are evaluated by unimodal valuations. This broad class of valuations includes…