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Existing Hardware Trojans (HT) detection methods face several critical limitations: logic testing struggles with scalability and coverage for large designs, side-channel analysis requires golden reference chips, and formal verification…
Hardware Trojans (HTs) remain a critical threat because learning-based detectors often overfit to narrow trigger/payload patterns and small, stylized benchmarks. We introduce TrojanGYM, an agentic, LLM-driven framework that automatically…
Chip manufacturing is a complex process, and to achieve a faster time to market, an increasing number of untrusted third-party tools and designs from around the world are being utilized. The use of these untrusted third party intellectual…
A globally distributed IC supply chain brings risks due to untrusted third parties. The risks span inadvertent use of hardware Trojan (HT), inserted Intellectual Property (3P-IP) or Electronic Design Automation (EDA) flows. HT can introduce…
Analog and mixed-signal (A/MS) integrated circuits (ICs) are integral to safety-critical applications. However, the globalization and outsourcing of A/MS ICs to untrusted third-party foundries expose them to security threats, particularly…
Current Hardware Trojan (HT) detection techniques are mostly developed based on a limited set of HT benchmarks. Existing HT benchmark circuits are generated with multiple shortcomings, i.e., i) they are heavily biased by the designers'…
The Hardware Trojan (HT) problem can be thought of as a continuous game between attackers and defenders, each striving to outsmart the other by leveraging any available means for an advantage. Machine Learning (ML) has recently played a key…
Hardware Trojans (HT s) are a persistent threat to integrated circuits, especially when inserted at the register-transfer level (RTL). Existing methods typically first convert the design into a graph, such as a gate-level netlist or an…
Object hallucination in Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) is a persistent failure mode that causes the model to perceive objects absent in the image. This weakness of MLLMs is currently studied using static benchmarks with fixed…
Automating hardware (HW) security vulnerability detection and mitigation during the design phase is imperative for two reasons: (i) It must be before chip fabrication, as post-fabrication fixes can be costly or even impractical; (ii) The…
Stealthy hardware Trojans (HTs) inserted during the fabrication of integrated circuits can bypass the security of critical infrastructures. Although researchers have proposed many techniques to detect HTs, several limitations exist,…
Industrial Systems-on-Chips (SoCs) often comprise hundreds of thousands to millions of nets and millions to tens of millions of connectivity edges, making empirical evaluation of hardware-Trojan (HT) detectors on realistic designs both…
This paper utilizes Reinforcement Learning (RL) as a means to automate the Hardware Trojan (HT) insertion process to eliminate the inherent human biases that limit the development of robust HT detection methods. An RL agent explores the…
High-level synthesis (HLS) is the next emerging trend for designing complex customized architectures for applications such as Machine Learning, Video Processing. It provides a higher level of abstraction and freedom to hardware engineers to…
Owning a high-end semiconductor foundry is a luxury very few companies can afford. Thus, fabless design companies outsource integrated circuit fabrication to third parties. Within foundries, rogue elements may gain access to the customer's…
Large Language Models (LLMs) are progressively being utilized as machine learning services and interface tools for various applications. However, the security implications of LLMs, particularly in relation to adversarial and Trojan attacks,…
Due to the current horizontal business model that promotes increasing reliance on untrusted third-party Intellectual Properties (IPs), CAD tools, and design facilities, hardware Trojan attacks have become a serious threat to the…
The globalization of the Integrated Circuit (IC) supply chain, driven by time-to-market and cost considerations, has made ICs vulnerable to hardware Trojans (HTs). Against this threat, a promising approach is to use Machine Learning…
The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into Electronic Design Automation (EDA) and hardware security is rapidly reshaping the semiconductor industry. While LLMs offer unprecedented capabilities in generating Register Transfer Level…
A potential vulnerability for integrated circuits (ICs) is the insertion of hardware trojans (HTs) during manufacturing. Understanding the practicability of such an attack can lead to appropriate measures for mitigating it. In this paper,…