Related papers: Capacity Constraints in Principal-Agent Problems

We give algorithms with constant-factor performance guarantees for several capacity and throughput problems in the SINR model. The algorithms are all based on a novel LP formulation for capacity problems. First, we give a new…

We consider a multi-agent optimal resource sharing problem that is represented by a linear program. The amount of resource to be shared is fixed, and agents belong to a population that is characterized probabilistically so as to allow…

In the principal-agent problem formulated by Myerson'82, agents have private information (type) and make private decisions (action), both of which are unobservable to the principal. Myerson pointed out an elegant linear programming solution…

In cooperative stochastic games multiple agents work towards learning joint optimal actions in an unknown environment to achieve a common goal. In many real-world applications, however, constraints are often imposed on the actions that can…

We consider adaptive decision-making problems where an agent optimizes a cumulative performance objective by repeatedly choosing among a finite set of options. Compared to the classical prediction-with-expert-advice set-up, we consider…

A new class of multi agent single machine scheduling problems is introduced, where each job is associated with a self interested agent with a utility function decreasing in completion time. We aim to achieve a fair solution by maximizing…

We study multi-agent contract design, where a principal incentivizes a team of agents to take costly actions that jointly determine the project success via a combinatorial reward function. While prior work largely focuses on unconstrained…

Consider costly and time-consuming tasks that add up to the success of a project, and must be fitted into a given time-frame. This is an instance of the classic budgeted maximization (knapsack) problem, which admits an FPTAS. Now assume an…

We analyze a two-period principal-agent model in which the principal faces a budget constraint, and the agent's private costs of performing tasks across the two periods may be correlated. We examine the optimal design of the reward scheme…

A principal selects a team of agents for collaborating on a joint project. The principal aims to design a revenue-optimal contract that incentivize the team of agents to exert costly effort while satisfying fairness constraints. We show…

In this paper, we investigate a constrained optimal coordination problem for a class of heterogeneous nonlinear multi-agent systems described by high-order dynamics subject to both unknown nonlinearities and external disturbances. Each…

We analyze a model of selling a single object to a principal-agent pair who want to acquire the object for a firm. The principal and the agent have different assessments of the object's value to the firm. The agent is budget-constrained…

Inspired by the recent COVID-19 pandemic, we study a generalization of the multi-resource allocation problem with heterogeneous demands and Leontief utilities. Unlike existing settings, we allow each agent to specify requirements to only…

We study the combinatorial contract design problem, introduced and studied by Dutting et. al. (2021, 2022), in both the single and multi-agent settings. Prior work has examined the problem when the principal's utility function is submodular…

Optimization is instrumental for improving operations of large-scale socio-technical infrastructures of Smart Cities, for instance, energy and traffic systems. In particular, understanding the performance of multi-agent discrete-choice…

The problem of time-constrained multi-agent task scheduling and control synthesis is addressed. We assume the existence of a high level plan which consists of a sequence of cooperative tasks, each of which is associated with a deadline and…

Advances in inference methods have enabled language models to improve their predictions without additional training. These methods often prioritize raw performance over cost-effective compute usage. However, computational efficiency is key…

We study the principal-agent problem with a third party that we call social planner, whose responsibility is to reconcile the conflicts of interest between the two players and induce socially optimal outcome in terms of some given social…

We study two combinatorial contract design models -- multi-agent and multi-action -- where a principal delegates the execution of a costly project to others. In both settings, the principal cannot observe the choices of the agent(s), only…

A principal must decide between two options. Which one she prefers depends on the private information of two agents. One agent always prefers the first option; the other always prefers the second. Transfers are infeasible. One application…