Related papers: Marginal Reputation
I study reputation formation in repeated games where player actions endogenously determine the probability the game permanently ends. Permanent exit can render reputation useless even to a patient long-lived player whose actions are…
Agents rarely act in isolation -- their behavioral history, in particular, is public to others. We seek a non-asymptotic understanding of how a leader agent should shape this history to its maximal advantage, knowing that follower agent(s)…
I study a repeated game in which a patient player (e.g., a seller) wants to win the trust of some myopic opponents (e.g., buyers) but can strictly benefit from betraying them. Her benefit from betrayal is strictly positive and is her…
We examine a patient player's behavior when he can build reputations in front of a sequence of myopic opponents. With positive probability, the patient player is a commitment type who plays his Stackelberg action in every period. We…
A patient player privately observes a persistent state that directly affects his myopic opponents' payoffs, and can be one of the several commitment types that plays the same mixed action in every period. I characterize the set of…
I revisit the canonical reputation framework in which a long-lived player interacts with a sequence of short-lived opponents and may be either strategic or a commitment type who always plays the same, possibly mixed, action. I depart by…
We analyze a reputational bargaining game in which a central player negotiates simultaneously with two peripheral players. Each player is either rational or a commitment type who never concedes and insists on a fixed share, and concessions…
We study dynamic signaling when the informed party does not observe the signals generated by her actions. A long-run player signals her type continuously over time to a myopic second player who privately monitors her behavior; in turn, the…
We study payoff manipulation in repeated multi-objective Stackelberg games, where a leader may strategically influence a follower's deterministic best response, e.g., by offering a share of their own payoff. We assume that the follower's…
Recent results in the ML community have revealed that learning algorithms used to compute the optimal strategy for the leader to commit to in a Stackelberg game, are susceptible to manipulation by the follower. Such a learning algorithm…
Through a stochastic control theoretic approach, we analyze reputation games where a strategic long-lived player acts in a sequential repeated game against a collection of short-lived players. The key assumption in our model is that the…
To take advantage of strategy commitment, a useful tactic of playing games, a leader must learn enough information about the follower's payoff function. However, this leaves the follower a chance to provide fake information and influence…
A Stackelberg game is played between a leader and a follower. The leader first chooses an action, then the follower plays his best response. The goal of the leader is to pick the action that will maximize his payoff given the follower's…
We consider a repeated sequential game between a learner, who plays first, and an opponent who responds to the chosen action. We seek to design strategies for the learner to successfully interact with the opponent. While most previous…
We introduce and study incentive equilibria for multi-player meanpayoff games. Incentive equilibria generalise well-studied solution concepts such as Nash equilibria and leader equilibria (also known as Stackelberg equilibria). Recall that…
We analyze situations in which players build reputations for honesty rather than for playing particular actions. A patient player facing a sequence of short-run opponents makes an announcement about their intended action after observing an…
We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information…
In many settings of interest, a policy is set by one party, the leader, in order to influence the action of another party, the follower, where the follower's response is determined by some private information. A natural question to ask is,…
In a multi-follower Bayesian Stackelberg game, a leader plays a mixed strategy over $L$ actions to which $n\ge 1$ followers, each having one of $K$ possible private types, best respond. The leader's optimal strategy depends on the…
The multilevel reverse Stackelberg game is considered. In this game, the leader controls the outcome by announcing a strategy as a function of decision variables of the followers to his/her own decision space. Corresponding to the leader's…