Related papers: Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Sub…

Modern ad auctions allow advertisers to target more specific segments of the user population. Unfortunately, this is not always in the best interest of the ad platform. In this paper, we examine the following basic question in the context…

In the problem of Submodular Max-Min Allocation, we are given a set of items, a set of players, and monotone submodular valuation functions that represent the satisfaction of a player with a certain subset of items. The goal is to find an…

Mechanism design, a branch of economics, aims to design rules that can autonomously achieve desired outcomes in resource allocation and public decision making. The research on mechanism design using machine learning is called automated…

For Bayesian combinatorial auctions, we present a general framework for approximately reducing the mechanism design problem for multiple buyers to single buyer sub-problems. Our framework can be applied to any setting which roughly…

We consider the problem of maximizing non-negative non-decreasing set functions. Although most of the recent work focus on exploiting submodularity, it turns out that several objectives we encounter in practice are not submodular.…

We study the design of prior-independent auctions in a setting with heterogeneous bidders. In particular, we consider the setting of selling to $n$ bidders whose values are drawn from $n$ independent but not necessarily identical…

Constrained submodular maximization has been extensively studied in the recent years. In this paper, we study adaptive robust optimization with nearly submodular structure (ARONSS). Our objective is to randomly select a subset of items that…

Recent empirical work demonstrates that online advertisement can exhibit bias in the delivery of ads across users even when all advertisers bid in a non-discriminatory manner. We study the design of ad auctions that, given fair bids, are…

In this paper, we present a new model and two mechanisms for auctions in two-sided markets of buyers and sellers, where budget constraints are imposed on buyers. Our model incorporates polymatroidal environments, and is applicable to a wide…

We design new approximation algorithms for the problems of optimizing submodular and supermodular functions subject to a single matroid constraint. Specifically, we consider the case in which we wish to maximize a nondecreasing submodular…

Given a sample of bids from independent auctions, this paper examines the question of inference on auction fundamentals (e.g. valuation distributions, welfare measures) under weak assumptions on information structure. The question is…

Motivated by Carbon Emissions Trading Schemes, Treasury Auctions, Procurement Auctions, and Wholesale Electricity Markets, which all involve the auctioning of homogeneous multiple units, we consider the problem of learning how to bid in…

Maximizing a submodular function has a wide range of applications in machine learning and data mining. One such application is data summarization whose goal is to select a small set of representative and diverse data items from a large…

We study a game with \emph{strategic} vendors who own multiple items and a single buyer with a submodular valuation function. The goal of the vendors is to maximize their revenue via pricing of the items, given that the buyer will buy the…

The existence of incentive-compatible computationally-efficient protocols for combinatorial auctions with decent approximation ratios is the paradigmatic problem in computational mechanism design. It is believed that in many cases good…

We study revenue optimization pricing algorithms for repeated posted-price auctions where a seller interacts with a single strategic buyer that holds a fixed private valuation. We show that, in the case when both the seller and the buyer…

Auctions are modeled as Bayesian games with continuous type and action spaces. Determining equilibria in auction games is computationally hard in general and no exact solution theory is known. We introduce an algorithmic framework in which…

We consider learning of submodular functions from data. These functions are important in machine learning and have a wide range of applications, e.g. data summarization, feature selection and active learning. Despite their combinatorial…

Submodular functions and their optimization have found applications in diverse settings ranging from machine learning and data mining to game theory and economics. In this work, we consider the constrained maximization of a submodular…

We study revenue optimization in a repeated auction between a single seller and a single buyer. Traditionally, the design of repeated auctions requires strong modeling assumptions about the bidder behavior, such as it being myopic, infinite…