Related papers: Quasi-stability notions in two-sided matching mode…
Several countries successfully use centralized matching schemes for school or higher education assignment, or for entry-level labour markets. In this paper we explore the computational aspects of a possible similar scheme for assigning…
In this paper, we consider one-to-one matchings between two disjoint groups of agents. Each agent has a preference over a subset of the agents in the other group, and these preferences may contain ties. Strong stability is one of the…
This paper develops an integer programming approach to two-sided many-to-one matching by investigating stable integral matchings of a fictitious market where each worker is divisible. We show that stable matchings exist in a discrete…
This paper establishes comprehensive stability results for quasi-variational inequalities (QVIs) under monotone perturbations of the governing operator. We prove strong convergence of both minimal and maximal solutions when sequences of…
In a dynamic matching market, such as a marriage or job market, how should agents balance accepting a proposed match with the cost of continuing their search? We consider this problem in a discrete setting, in which agents have cardinal…
Consider a cyclically ordered collection of $r$ equinumerous agent sets with strict preferences of every agent over the agents from the next agent set. A weakly stable cyclic matching is a partition of the set of agents into disjoint union…
Due to their algorithmic simplicity and high accuracy, force-based model coupling techniques are an exciting development in computational physics. For example, the force-based quasicontinuum approximation is the only known pointwise…
We consider stability concepts for random matchings where agents have preferences over objects and objects have priorities for the agents. When matchings are deterministic, the standard stability concept also captures the fairness property…
This paper introduces and investigates the class of \textit{$k$-quasi $n$-power posinormal operators} in Hilbert spaces, generalizing both posinormal and $n$-power posinormal operators. We establish fundamental properties including matrix…
Two-sided matching markets, environments in which two disjoint groups of agents seek to partner with one another, arise in several contexts. In static, centralized markets where agents know their preferences, standard algorithms can yield a…
Many complex systems share two characteristics: 1) they are stochastic in nature, and 2) they are characterized by a large number of factors. At the same time, various natural complex systems appear to have two types of intertwined…
In many economic contexts, agents from a same population team up to better exploit their human capital. In such contexts (often called "roommate matching problems"), stable matchings may fail to exist even when utility is transferable. We…
Assignment markets involve matching with transfers, as in labor markets and housing markets. We consider a two-sided assignment market with agent types and stochastic structure similar to models used in empirical studies, and characterize…
Many-to-one matching markets exist in numerous different forms, such as college admissions, matching medical interns to hospitals for residencies, assigning housing to college students, and the classic firms and workers market. In all these…
For a class of quasi-variational inequalities (QVIs) of obstacle-type the stability of its solution set and associated optimal control problems are considered. These optimal control problems are non-standard in the sense that they involve…
We study deviations by a group of agents in the three main types of matching markets: the house allocation, the marriage, and the roommates models. For a given instance, we call a matching $k$-stable if no other matching exists that is more…
We study resource allocation in two-sided markets from a fundamental perspective and introduce a general modeling and algorithmic framework to effectively incorporate the complex and multidimensional aspects of fairness. Our main technical…
When a system has more than one stable state, how can the stability of these states be compared? This deceptively simple question has important consequences for ecosystems, because systems with alternative stable states can undergo dramatic…
We introduce a new class of asymptotic contractions that employs two quasi-metrics defined directly in terms of the underlying mapping. The contraction condition compares these two quantities via a sequence of bounding functions that…
We study the classical, two-sided stable marriage problem under pairwise preferences. In the most general setting, agents are allowed to express their preferences as comparisons of any two of their edges and they also have the right to…