Related papers: A Dynamic Matching Framework for Faster Child Adop…
Dynamical systems can autonomously adapt their organization so that the required target dynamics is reproduced. In the previous Rapid Communication [Phys. Rev. E 90,030901(R) (2014)], it was shown how such systems can be designed using…
We introduce a new model for two-sided matching which allows us to borrow popular fairness notions from the fair division literature such as envy-freeness up to one good and maximin share guarantee. In our model, each agent is matched to…
Problem definition: In many matching markets, some agents are fully flexible, while others only accept a subset of jobs. For example, ridesharing drivers can specify on the platform the destinations they are willing to accept. Conventional…
The Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism can generate inefficient placements. Although Pareto-dominant mechanisms exist, it remains unclear which and how many students could improve. We characterize the set of unimprovable students and show…
In the dynamic set cover problem, the input is a dynamic universe of elements and a fixed collection of sets. As elements are inserted or deleted, the goal is to efficiently maintain an approximate minimum set cover. While the past decade…
We consider the problem of stable matching with dynamic preference lists. At each time step, the preference list of some player may change by swapping random adjacent members. The goal of a central agency (algorithm) is to maintain an…
Some of the most relevant future applications of multi-agent systems like autonomous driving or factories as a service display mixed-motive scenarios, where agents might have conflicting goals. In these settings agents are likely to learn…
The rapidly changing landscapes of modern optimization problems require algorithms that can be adapted in real-time. This paper introduces an Adaptive Metaheuristic Framework (AMF) designed for dynamic environments. It is capable of…
Machine learning models trained on uncurated datasets can often end up adversely affecting inputs belonging to underrepresented groups. To address this issue, we consider the problem of adaptively constructing training sets which allow us…
A classic trade-off that school districts face when deciding which matching algorithm to use is that it is not possible to always respect both priorities and preferences. The student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) respects…
Kidney transplants are sharply overdemanded in the United States. A recent innovation to address organ shortages is a kidney exchange, in which willing but medically incompatible patient-donor pairs swap donors so that two successful…
Sequential fundraising in two sided online platforms enable peer to peer lending by sequentially bringing potential contributors, each of whose decisions impact other contributors in the market. However, understanding the dynamics of…
Under preferential attachment (PA) network growth models late arrivals are at a disadvantage with regard to their final degrees. Previous extensions of PA have addressed this deficiency by either adding the notion of node fitness to PA,…
In many two-sided labor markets, interviews are conducted before matches are formed. The growing number of interviews in medical residency markets has increased demand for signaling mechanisms, where applicants send a limited number of…
We consider a model for repeated stochastic matching where compatibility is probabilistic, is realized the first time agents are matched, and persists in the future. Such a model has applications in the gig economy, kidney exchange, and…
We study mechanism design when a designer repeatedly uses a fixed mechanism to interact with strategic agents who learn from observing their allocations. We introduce a static framework, calibrated mechanism design, requiring mechanisms to…
Embedded systems are becoming more in demand to work in dynamic and uncertain environments, and being confined to the strong requirements of real-time. Conventional static scheduling models usually cannot cope with runtime modification in…
Adaptivity to changing environments and constraints is key to success in modern society. We address this by proposing "incrementalized versions" of Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates. That is, we try to answer the following question: for…
We consider a two-sided matching problem in which the agents on one side have dichotomous preferences and the other side representing institutions has strict preferences (priorities). It captures several important applications in matching…
We provide a framework to study stability notions for two-sided dynamic matching markets in which matching is one-to-one and irreversible. The framework gives center stage to the set of matchings an agent anticipates would ensue should they…