Related papers: Informational Puts
We consider a sender-receiver game with an outside option for the sender. After the cheap talk phase, the receiver makes a proposal to the sender, which the latter can reject. We study situations in which the sender's approval is crucial to…
In this paper, we study platforms where resources and jobs are spatially distributed, and resources have the flexibility to strategically move to different locations for better payoffs. The price of the service at each location depends on…
Coordinating the behaviour of self-interested agents in the presence of multiple Nash equilibria is a major research challenge for multi-agent systems. Pre-game communication between all the players can aid coordination in cases where the…
I consider an environment in which a decision maker faces uncertainty and privately holds information in the form of a signal about the true state of the world. The decision maker purchases additional information from a data broker before…
We study the problem of information provision by a strategic central planner who can publicly signal about an uncertain infectious risk parameter. Signalling leads to an updated public belief over the parameter, and agents then make…
We study how a principal can jointly shape an agent's timing and action through information. We develop a revelation principle: with intertemporal commitment, the problem simplifies to choosing a joint distribution over stopping times and…
We develop an empirical framework for analyzing dynamic games when the underlying information structure is unknown to the analyst. We introduce \textit{Markov correlated equilibrium}, a dynamic analog of Bayes correlated equilibrium, and…
We consider a routing game among non-atomic agents where link latency functions are conditional on an uncertain state of the network. The agents have the same prior belief about the state, but only a fixed fraction receive private route…
Bayesian optimal experiments that maximize the information gained from collected data are critical to efficiently identify behavioral models. We extend a seminal method for designing Bayesian optimal experiments by introducing two…
Coordination games have been of interest to game theorists, economists, and ecologists for many years to study such problems as the emergence of local conventions and the evolution of cooperative behavior. Approaches for understanding the…
An agent makes decisions based on multiple sources of information. In isolation, each source is well understood, but their correlation is unknown. We study the agent's robustly optimal strategies -- those that give the best possible…
In this paper we design information elicitation mechanisms for Bayesian auctions. While in Bayesian mechanism design the distributions of the players' private types are often assumed to be common knowledge, information elicitation considers…
In this paper we model a game such that all strategies are non-revealing, with imperfect recall and incomplete information. We also introduce a modified sliding-block code as a linear transformation which generates common knowledge of how…
Strategic interactions between competitive entities are generally considered from the perspective of complete revelation of benefits achieved from those interactions, in the form of public payoff functions and/or beliefs, in the announced…
In the standard Minority Game, players use historical minority choices as the sole public information to pick one out of the two alternatives. However, publishing historical minority choices is not the only way to present global system…
An agent, or a coalition of agents, faces an ethical dilemma between several statements if she is forced to make a conscious choice between which of these statements will be true. This paper proposes to capture ethical dilemmas as a…
Transparency of information disclosure has always been considered an instrumental component of effective governance, accountability, and ethical behavior in any organization or system. However, a natural question follows: \emph{what is the…
So far, the theory of equilibrium selection in the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma is insensitive to communication possibilities. To address this issue, we incorporate the assumption that communication reduces -- but does not…
Zero-sum asymmetric games model decision making scenarios involving two competing players who have different information about the game being played. A particular case is that of nested information, where one (informed) player has superior…
One of the reasons why stochastic dynamic games with an underlying dynamic system are challenging is since strategic players have access to enormous amount of information which leads to the use of extremely complex strategies at…