Related papers: Informational Puts
This paper studies multi-user communication systems with two groups of users: leaders which possess system information, and followers which have no system information using the formulation of Stackelberg games. In such games, the leaders…
We consider any network environment in which the "best shot game" is played. This is the case where the possible actions are only two for every node (0 and 1), and the best response for a node is 1 if and only if all her neighbors play 0. A…
This work considers a novel information design problem and studies how the craft of payoff-relevant environmental signals solely can influence the behaviors of intelligent agents. The agents' strategic interactions are captured by an…
To what extent can an external observer observing an equilibrium action distribution in an incomplete information game infer the underlying information structure? We investigate this issue in a general linear-quadratic-Gaussian framework. A…
We consider 2-player stochastic games with perfectly observed actions, and study the limit, as the discount factor goes to one, of the equilibrium payoffs set. In the usual setup where current states are observed by the players, we show…
This article takes an oblique sidestep from two previous papers, wherein an approach to reformulation of game theory in terms of information theory, topology, as well as a few other notions was indicated. In this document a description is…
In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has…
We consider a two-player dynamic information design problem between a principal and a receiver -- a game is played between the two agents on top of a Markovian system controlled by the receiver's actions, where the principal obtains and…
Two dynamic game forms are said to be behaviorally equivalent if they share the "same" profiles of structurally reduced strategies (Battigalli et al., 2020). In the context of dynamic implementation, behaviorally equivalent game forms are…
Limited lookahead has been studied for decades in perfect-information games. We initiate a new direction via two simultaneous deviation points: generalization to imperfect-information games and a game-theoretic approach. We study how one…
Information design in an incomplete information game includes a designer with the goal of influencing players' actions through signals generated from a designed probability distribution so that its objective function is optimized. We…
Institutions and investors face the constant challenge of making accurate decisions and predictions regarding how best they should distribute their endowments. The problem of achieving an optimal outcome at minimal cost has been extensively…
Achieving seamless coordination in cooperative games is a crucial challenge in artificial intelligence, particularly when players operate under incomplete information. While communication helps, it is not always feasible. In this paper, we…
Social-media platforms are one of the most prevalent communication media today. In such systems, a large amount of content is generated and available to the platform. However, not all content can be transmitted to every possible user at all…
This paper concerns sequential hypothesis testing in competitive multi-agent systems where agents exchange potentially manipulated information. Specifically, a two-agent scenario is studied where each agent aims to correctly infer the true…
We study information design settings where the designer controls information about a state, and there are multiple agents interacting in a game who are privately informed about their types. Each agent's utility depends on all agents' types…
This work considers a novel information design problem and studies how the craft of payoff-relevant environmental signals solely can influence the behaviors of intelligent agents. The agents' strategic interactions are captured by a Markov…
Interdependent-choice equilibrium is defined as an extension of correlated equilibrium in which the mediator is able to choose the timing of her signals, and observe the actions taken by the players. The set of interdependent-choice…
We describe an algorithm for computing best response strategies in a class of two-player infinite games of incomplete information, defined by payoffs piecewise linear in agents' types and actions, conditional on linear comparisons of…
A description of static equilibria in the noisy binary choice (Ising) game on complete and random graphs resulting from maximisation of the likelihood of system configurations is presented. An equivalence of such likelihood equilibria to…