Related papers: Mechanisms for a dynamic many-to-many school choic…
The Deferred Acceptance algorithm is a popular school allocation mechanism thanks to its strategy proofness. However, with application costs, strategy proofness fails, leading to an identification problem. In this paper, I address this…
While significant advancements have been made in the field of fair machine learning, the majority of studies focus on scenarios where the decision model operates on a static population. In this paper, we study fairness in dynamic systems…
Class-imbalance refers to classification problems in which many more instances are available for certain classes than for others. Such imbalanced datasets require special attention because traditional classifiers generally favor the…
School choice is the two-sided matching market where students (on one side) are to be matched with schools (on the other side) based on their mutual preferences. The classical algorithm to solve this problem is the celebrated deferred…
Reinforcement Learning (RL) has achieved significant success in solving single-goal tasks. However, uniform goal selection often results in sample inefficiency in multi-goal settings where agents must learn a universal goal-conditioned…
We address the problem of predicting the correctness of the student's response on the next exam question based on their previous interactions in the course of their learning and evaluation process. We model the student performance as a…
Recent literature shows that dynamic matching mechanisms may outperform the standard mechanisms to deliver desirable results. We highlight an under-explored design dimension, the time constraints that students face under such a dynamic…
Temporal difference (TD) methods constitute a class of methods for learning predictions in multi-step prediction problems, parameterized by a recency factor lambda. Currently the most important application of these methods is to temporal…
This paper introduces a novel measurement of informational size to school choice problems, which inherits its ideas from Mount and Reiter (1974). This concept measures a matching mechanism's information size by counting the maximal relevant…
This paper addresses key challenges in task scheduling for multi-tenant distributed systems, including dynamic resource variation, heterogeneous tenant demands, and fairness assurance. An adaptive scheduling method based on reinforcement…
This paper studies a dynamic discrete-time queuing model where at every period players get a new job and must send all their jobs to a queue that has a limited capacity. Players have an incentive to send their jobs as late as possible;…
Many two-sided matching markets, from labor markets to school choice programs, use a clearinghouse based on the applicant-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, which is well known to be strategy-proof for the applicants. Nonetheless, a…
We examine multi-task benchmarks in machine learning through the lens of social choice theory. We draw an analogy between benchmarks and electoral systems, where models are candidates and tasks are voters. This suggests a distinction…
The student-optimal stable mechanism (DA), the most popular mechanism in school choice, is the only one that is stable and strategy-proof. However, when DA is implemented, a student can change the schools of others without changing her own.…
This paper proposes a policy-based deep reinforcement learning hyper-heuristic framework for solving the Job Shop Scheduling Problem. The hyper-heuristic agent learns to switch scheduling rules based on the system state dynamically. We…
We build on the stability-preserving school choice model introduced and studied recently in [MV18]. We settle several of their open problems and we define and solve a couple of new ones.
As multi-task models gain popularity in a wider range of machine learning applications, it is becoming increasingly important for practitioners to understand the fairness implications associated with those models. Most existing fairness…
We study the problem of capacity modification in the many-to-one stable matching of workers and firms. Our goal is to systematically study how the set of stable matchings changes when some seats are added to or removed from the firms. We…
Two-sided matching markets have long existed to pair agents in the absence of regulated exchanges. A common example is school choice, where a matching mechanism uses student and school preferences to assign students to schools. In such…
Multi-Task Learning is a learning paradigm that uses correlated tasks to improve performance generalization. A common way to learn multiple tasks is through the hard parameter sharing approach, in which a single architecture is used to…