Related papers: From Design to Disclosure
This paper studies optimal mechanisms for collecting and trading data. Consumers benefit from revealing information about their tastes to a service provider because this improves the service. However, the information is also valuable to a…
How do consultants price expertise? This paper studies a problem of selling information products (expertise) to a buyer (client) who faces decision-making problem under uncertainty. The client is privately informed about the type of…
Interacting agents receive public information at no cost and flexibly acquire private information at a cost proportional to entropy reduction. When a policymaker provides more public information, agents acquire less private information,…
We consider a platform facilitating trade between sellers and buyers with the objective of maximizing consumer surplus. Even though in many such marketplaces prices are set by revenue-maximizing sellers, platforms can influence prices…
A monopolistic seller aims to sell an indivisible item to multiple potential buyers. Each buyer's valuation depends on their private type and the item's quality. The seller can observe the quality but it is unknown to buyers. This quality…
We consider a team-production environment where all participants are motivated by career concerns, and where a team's joint productive outcome may have different reputational implications for different team members. In this context, we…
We study an information design problem with two informed senders and a receiver in which, in contrast to traditional Bayesian persuasion settings, senders do not have commitment power. In our setting, a trusted mediator/platform gathers…
This paper studies lying in a novel context. Previous work has focused on situations in which people are either fully aware of the economic consequences of all available actions (e.g., die-under-cup paradigm), or they are uncertain, but…
We study the problem of data disclosure with privacy guarantees, wherein the utility of the disclosed data is ensured via a \emph{hard distortion} constraint. Unlike average distortion, hard distortion provides a deterministic guarantee of…
Robust machine learning formulations have emerged to address the prevalent vulnerability of deep neural networks to adversarial examples. Our work draws the connection between optimal robust learning and the privacy-utility tradeoff…
Recent work on reducing bias in NLP models usually focuses on protecting or isolating information related to a sensitive attribute (like gender or race). However, when sensitive information is semantically entangled with the task…
The question we raise through this paper is: Is it economically feasible to trade consumer personal information with their formal consent (permission) and in return provide them incentives (monetary or otherwise)?. In view of (a) the…
In this paper, we study platforms where resources and jobs are spatially distributed, and resources have the flexibility to strategically move to different locations for better payoffs. The price of the service at each location depends on…
Artificial intelligence algorithms have been used to enhance a wide variety of products and services, including assisting human decision making in high-stakes contexts. However, these algorithms are complex and have trade-offs, notably…
We study mechanism design in environments where agents have private preferences and private information about a common payoff-relevant state. In such settings with multi-dimensional types, standard mechanisms fail to implement efficient…
In this paper we describe a decision process framework allowing an agent to decide what information it should reveal to its neighbours within a communication graph in order to maximise its utility. We assume that these neighbours can pass…
In a continuous-time setting we investigate how the management of a firm controls a dynamic choice between two generic voluntary disclosure decision rules: one with full and transparent disclosure termed $\it{candid}$, the other, termed…
We study economies where consumers interact independently with many monopolists. When consumer valuations over goods are correlated, correlation can distort the induced distribution of consumer surplus (information rents). We identify which…
Consider a market where a seller owns an item for sale and a buyer wants to purchase it. Each player has private information, known as their type. It can be costly and difficult for the players to reach an agreement through direct…
The information released to investors in financial markets has various forms. We refer to range information as information about the upper and lower bound which the payoff of a risky asset may reach in the future. This study develops…