Related papers: Towards evaluations-based safety cases for AI sche…
We introduce a conceptual framework and provide considerations for the institutional design of AI incident reporting systems, i.e., processes for collecting information about safety- and rights-related events caused by general-purpose AI.…
AI Safety has become a vital front-line concern of many scientists within and outside the AI community. There are many immediate and long term anticipated risks that range from existential risk to human existence to deep fakes and bias in…
Instances of Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems failing to deliver consistent, satisfactory performance are legion. We investigate why AI failures occur. We address only a narrow subset of the broader field of AI Safety. We focus on AI…
We draw on our experience working on system and software assurance and evaluation for systems important to society to summarise how safety engineering is performed in traditional critical systems, such as aircraft flight control. We analyse…
As AI technologies increase in capability and ubiquity, AI accidents are becoming more common. Based on normal accident theory, high reliability theory, and open systems theory, we create a framework for understanding the risks associated…
Highly capable AI systems could secretly pursue misaligned goals -- what we call "scheming". Because a scheming AI would deliberately try to hide its misaligned goals and actions, measuring and mitigating scheming requires different…
With artificial intelligence (AI) being applied to bring autonomy to decision-making in safety-critical domains such as the ones typified in the aerospace and emergency-response services, there has been a call to address the ethical…
Developing and implementing AI-based solutions help state and federal government agencies, research institutions, and commercial companies enhance decision-making processes, automate chain operations, and reduce the consumption of natural…
As AI systems become increasingly capable, safety strategies must be evaluated not only by how much they reduce present risk, but by whether they could sustain safety once external control can no longer reliably constrain system behavior.…
Artificial intelligence risks are multidimensional in nature, as the same risk scenarios may have legal, operational, and financial risk dimensions. With the emergence of new AI regulations, the state of the art of artificial intelligence…
As AI systems approach dangerous capability levels where inability safety cases become insufficient, we need alternative approaches to ensure safety. This paper presents a roadmap for constructing safety cases based on chain-of-thought…
This position paper argues for two claims regarding AI testing and evaluation. First, to remain informative about deployment behaviour, evaluations need account for the possibility that AI systems understand their circumstances and reason…
Concerns around future dangers from advanced AI often centre on systems hypothesised to have intrinsic characteristics such as agent-like behaviour, strategic awareness, and long-range planning. We label this cluster of characteristics as…
Several jurisdictions are starting to regulate frontier artificial intelligence (AI) systems, i.e. general-purpose AI systems that match or exceed the capabilities present in the most advanced systems. To reduce risks from these systems,…
There is a growing focus on how to design safe artificial intelligent (AI) agents. As systems become more complex, poorly specified goals or control mechanisms may cause AI agents to engage in unwanted and harmful outcomes. Thus it is…
As AI rapidly advances, the security risks posed by AI are becoming increasingly severe, especially in critical scenarios, including those posing existential risks. If AI becomes uncontrollable, manipulated, or actively evades safety…
Mistakes in AI systems are inevitable, arising from both technical limitations and sociotechnical gaps. While black-boxing AI systems can make the user experience seamless, hiding the seams risks disempowering users to mitigate fallouts…
An assurance case is a structured argument, typically produced by safety engineers, to communicate confidence that a critical or complex system, such as an aircraft, will be acceptably safe within its intended context. Assurance cases often…
Frontier AI companies first deploy their most advanced models internally, for weeks or months of safety testing, evaluation, and iteration, before a possible public release. For example, Anthropic recently developed a new class of model…
AI systems are often introduced with high expectations, yet many fail to deliver, resulting in unintended harm and missed opportunities for benefit. We frequently observe significant "AI Mismatches", where the system's actual performance…