Related papers: Flexible Demand Manipulation
We study price regulation for a monopolist operating in networked markets with demand spillovers. Achieving efficiency requires price reductions proportional to consumers' Katz-Bonacich centralities, which generally cannot be implemented by…
Motivated by applications to word-of-mouth advertising, we consider a game-theoretic scenario in which competing advertisers want to target initial adopters in a social network. Each advertiser wishes to maximize the resulting cascade of…
Consider the seller's problem of finding optimal prices for her $n$ (divisible) goods when faced with a set of $m$ consumers, given that she can only observe their purchased bundles at posted prices, i.e., revealed preferences. We study…
Motivated by the prevalence of prediction problems in the economy, we study markets in which firms sell models to a consumer to help improve their prediction. Firms decide whether to enter, choose models to train on their data, and set…
Suppliers of differentiated goods make simultaneous pricing decisions, which are strategically linked. Because of market power, the equilibrium is inefficient. We study how a policymaker should target a budget-balanced tax-and-subsidy…
Market manipulation is a strategy used by traders to alter the price of financial securities. One type of manipulation is based on the process of buying or selling assets by using several trading strategies, among them spoofing is a popular…
Motivated by Germany's April 2026 fuel price regulation, in this note I study a two-period pricing problem with demand uncertainty and a rule that prohibits more than one price increase during the day. Under flexible pricing, the firm…
Manipulation is a common concern in many domains, such as social media, advertising, and chatbots. As AI systems mediate more of our interactions with the world, it is important to understand the degree to which AI systems might manipulate…
Cross-group externalities and network effects in two-sided platform markets shape market structure and competition policy, and are the subject of extensive study. Less understood are the within-group externalities that arise when the…
It can be observed that the purchasing decision of an individual consumer in an electronic marketplace is determined by a set of factors, such as personal characteristics of the consumer, product pricing, minimum price-quantity combination…
We consider the problem of devising incentive strategies for viral marketing of a product. In particular, we assume that the seller can influence penetration of the product by offering two incentive programs: a) direct incentives to…
A fundamental result in mechanism design theory, the so-called revelation principle, asserts that for many questions concerning the existence of mechanisms with a given outcome one can restrict attention to truthful direct…
Interacting agents receive public information at no cost and flexibly acquire private information at a cost proportional to entropy reduction. When a policymaker provides more public information, agents acquire less private information,…
A monopolist sells goods with possibly a characteristic consumers dislike (for instance, he sells random goods to risk averse agents), which does not affect the production costs. We investigate the question whether using undesirable goods…
We consider mechanisms for markets that are double-sided and have players with multi-dimensional strategic spaces on at least one side. The players of the market are strategic, and act to optimize their own utilities. The mechanism…
With the growing collection of sales and marketing data and depth of detailed knowledge of consumer habits and trends, firms are gaining the capability to discern customers of other firms from the potential market of uncommitted consumers.…
In this chapter we review some recent results on the dynamics of price formation in financial markets and its relations with the efficient market hypothesis. Specifically, we present the limit order book mechanism for markets and we…
We study the optimal design of electricity contracts among a population of consumers with different needs. This question is tackled within the framework of Principal-Agent problems in presence of adverse selection. The particular features…
Welfare economics relies on access to agents' utility functions: we revisit classical questions in welfare economics, assuming access to data on agents' past choices instead of their utilities. Our main result considers the existence of…
Understanding the bias-variance tradeoff in user representation learning is essential for improving recommendation quality in modern content platforms. While well studied in static settings, this tradeoff becomes significantly more complex…