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We study resource allocation in two-sided markets from a fundamental perspective and introduce a general modeling and algorithmic framework to effectively incorporate the complex and multidimensional aspects of fairness. Our main technical…
Researchers have long proposed using economic approaches to resource allocation in computer systems. However, few of these proposals became operational, let alone commercial. Questions persist about the economic approach regarding its…
Resource distribution is a fundamental problem in economic and policy design, particularly when demand and supply are not naturally aligned. Without regulation, wealthier individuals may monopolize this resource, leaving the needs of others…
The issue of fairness in AI arises from discriminatory practices in applications like job recommendations and risk assessments, emphasising the need for algorithms that do not discriminate based on group characteristics. This concern is…
Our work is devoted to the metric facility location problem and addresses the selfish behavior of the players. It contributes to the line of work initiated by Procaccia and Tennenholtz [EC09] on approximate mechanism design without money.…
We study buyer-optimal procurement mechanisms when quality is contractible. When some costs are borne by every participant of a procurement auction regardless of winning, the classic analysis should be amended. We show that an optimal…
We study a participatory budgeting problem, where a set of strategic agents wish to split a divisible budget among different projects, by aggregating their proposals on a single division. Unfortunately, the straight-forward rule that…
We introduce a novel family of mechanisms for constrained allocation problems which we call local priority mechanisms. These mechanisms are parameterized by a function which assigns a set of agents, the local compromisers, to every…
The paper considers a general model of electoral systems combining district-based elections with a compensatory mechanism in order to create any outcome between strictly majoritarian and purely proportional seat allocation. It contains vote…
We analyze the structure of the market for foundation models, i.e., large AI models such as those that power ChatGPT and that are adaptable to downstream uses, and we examine the implications for competition policy and regulation. We…
We design two mechanisms that ensure that the majority preferred option wins in all equilibria. The first one is a simultaneous game where agents choose other agents to cooperate with on top of the vote for an alternative, thus overcoming…
How does one allocate a collection of resources to a set of strategic agents in a fair and efficient manner without using money? For in many scenarios it is not feasible to use money to compensate agents for otherwise unsatisfactory…
Given facilities with capacities and clients with penalties and demands, the transportation problem with market choice consists in finding the minimum-cost way to partition the clients into unserved clients, paying the penalties, and into…
Although both data availability and the demand for accurate forecasts are increasing, collaboration between stakeholders is often constrained by data ownership and competitive interests. In contrast to recent proposals within cooperative…
According to the proportional allocation mechanism from the network optimization literature, users compete for a divisible resource -- such as bandwidth -- by submitting bids. The mechanism allocates to each user a fraction of the resource…
Generalization of the minority game to more than one market is considered. At each time step every agent chooses one of its strategies and acts on the market related to this strategy. If the payoff function allows for strong fluctuation of…
We introduce the notion of fault tolerant mechanism design, which extends the standard game theoretic framework of mechanism design to allow for uncertainty about execution. Specifically, we define the problem of task allocation in which…
We study mechanism design for combinatorial cost sharing. Imagine that multiple items or services are available to be shared among a set of interested agents. The outcome of a mechanism in this setting consists of an assignment, determining…
The market economy deals with many interacting agents such as buyers and sellers who are autonomous intelligent agents pursuing their own interests. One such multi-agent system (MAS) that plays an important role in auctions is the…
We revisit the classic problem of fair division from a mechanism design perspective, using {\em Proportional Fairness} as a benchmark. In particular, we aim to allocate a collection of divisible items to a set of agents while incentivizing…