Related papers: Combinatorial Diffusion Auction Design
The classic result of Bulow and Klemperer \cite{BK96} says that in a single-item auction recruiting one more bidder and running the Vickrey auction achieves a higher revenue than the optimal auction's revenue on the original set of bidders,…
With the emerging technologies of Internet of Things (IOTs), the capabilities of mobile devices have increased tremendously. However, in the big data era, to complete tasks on one device is still challenging. As an emerging technology,…
Combinatorial auctions (CA) are a well-studied area in algorithmic mechanism design. However, contrary to the standard model, empirical studies suggest that a bidder's valuation often does not depend solely on the goods assigned to him. For…
Online advertising has become a core revenue driver for the internet industry, with ad auctions playing a crucial role in ensuring platform revenue and advertiser incentives. Traditional auction mechanisms, like GSP, rely on the independent…
We present our results on Uniform Price Auctions, one of the standard sealed-bid multi-unit auction formats, for selling multiple identical units of a single good to multi-demand bidders. Contrary to the truthful and economically efficient…
Auctions are becoming an increasingly popular method for transacting business, especially over the Internet. This article presents a general approach to building autonomous bidding agents to bid in multiple simultaneous auctions for…
With spectrum auctions as our prime motivation, in this paper we analyze combinatorial auctions where agents' valuations exhibit complementarities. Assuming that the agents only value bundles of size at most $k$ and also assuming that we…
Simple Clock Auctions (SCA) are a mechanism commonly used in spectrum auctions to sell lots of frequency bandwidths. We study such an auction with one player having access to perfect information against straightforward bidders. When the…
In digital goods auctions, there is an auctioneer who sells an item with unlimited supply to a set of potential buyers, and the objective is to design truthful auction to maximize the total profit of the auctioneer. Motivated from an…
Given a sample of bids from independent auctions, this paper examines the question of inference on auction fundamentals (e.g. valuation distributions, welfare measures) under weak assumptions on information structure. The question is…
For an artist or a graphic designer, the spatial layout of a scene is a critical design choice. However, existing text-to-image diffusion models provide limited support for incorporating spatial information. This paper introduces Composite…
This paper considers an electric vehicle charging scheduling setting where vehicle users can reserve charging time in advance at a charging station. In this setting, users are allowed to explicitly express their preferences over different…
We investigate revenue maximization problems in auctions for dynamic spectrum access. We consider the frequency division and spread spectrum methods of dynamic spectrum sharing. In the frequency division method, a primary spectrum user…
The combinatorial auction (CA) is an efficient mechanism for resource allocation in different fields, including cloud computing. It can obtain high economic efficiency and user flexibility by allowing bidders to submit bids for combinations…
As commerce shifts to digital marketplaces, platforms increasingly monetize traffic through Sponsored Shopping auctions. Unlike classic ``Sponsored Search", where an advertiser typically bids for a single link, these settings involve…
In this paper, we propose a novel sealed-bid auction framework to address the problem of dynamic spectrum allocation in cognitive radio (CR) networks. We design an optimal auction mechanism that maximizes the moderator's expected utility,…
We develop a novel optimization model to maximize the profit of a Demand-Side Platform (DSP) while ensuring that the budget utilization preferences of the DSP's advertiser clients are adequately met. Our model is highly flexible and can be…
We consider the problem of finding the (unique) minimal Walrasian equilibrium price in multi-item, multi-unit auction models: there are multiple indivisible items for sale, with several units of each item, and a bidder may be interested in…
Bidding in simultaneous auctions is challenging because an agent's value for a good in one auction may depend on the uncertain outcome of other auctions: the so-called exposure problem. Given the gap in understanding of general simultaneous…
We propose a novel statistical learning method for multi-item auctions that incorporates credible intervals. Our approach employs nonparametric density estimation to estimate credible intervals for bidder types based on historical data. We…