Related papers: EFX Allocations and Orientations on Bipartite Mult…
The two standard fairness notions in the resource allocation literature are proportionality and envy-freeness. If there are n agents competing for the available resources, then proportionality requires that each agent receives at least a…
A vertex set $D$ in a finite undirected graph $G$ is an {\em efficient dominating set} (\emph{e.d.s.}\ for short) of $G$ if every vertex of $G$ is dominated by exactly one vertex of $D$. The \emph{Efficient Domination} (ED) problem, which…
We consider a multi-agent model for fair division of mixed manna (i.e. items for which agents can have positive, zero or negative utilities), in which agents have additive utilities for bundles of items. For this model, we give several…
We study the problem of allocating $m$ indivisible items to $n$ agents with additive utilities. It is desirable for the allocation to be both fair and efficient, which we formalize through the notions of envy-freeness and Pareto-optimality.…
One of the important yet insufficiently studied subjects in fair allocation is the externality effect among agents. For a resource allocation problem, externalities imply that a bundle allocated to an agent may affect the utilities of other…
The problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items is a well-known challenge in the field of (computational) social choice. In this scenario, there is a fundamental incompatibility between notions of fairness (such as envy-freeness…
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible items among agents whose preferences include externalities. Unlike the standard fair division model, agents may derive positive or negative utility not only from items allocated…
The goal of fair division is to distribute resources among competing players in a "fair" way. Envy-freeness is the most extensively studied fairness notion in fair division. Envy-free allocations do not always exist with indivisible goods,…
Fair allocation of indivisible goods is a fundamental problem at the interface of economics and computer science. Traditional approaches focus either on randomized allocations that are fair in expectation or deterministic allocations that…
We study a fair allocation problem of indivisible items under additive externalities in which each agent also receives values from items that are assigned to other agents. We propose several new fairness concepts. We extend the well-studied…
We study the problem of dividing indivisible chores among agents whose costs (for the chores) are supermodular set functions with binary marginals. Such functions capture complementarity among chores, i.e., they constitute an expressive…
We introduce a variation of the scheduling with precedence constraints problem that has applications to molecular folding and production management. We are given a bipartite graph $H=(B,S)$. Vertices in $B$ are thought of as goods or…
We study fair allocation of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. We obtain novel approximation guarantees for three of the strongest fairness notions in discrete fair division, namely envy-free up to the removal of any…
Topological drawings are natural representations of graphs in the plane, where vertices are represented by points, and edges by curves connecting the points. Topological drawings of complete graphs and of complete bipartite graphs have been…
We study the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuation functions. Envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) is a well-studied fairness notion for indivisible goods, while Pareto optimality…
House Allocations concern with matchings involving one-sided preferences, where houses serve as a proxy encoding valuable indivisible resources (e.g. organs, course seats, subsidized public housing units) to be allocated among the agents.…
We study the problem of finding fair and efficient allocations of a set of indivisible items to a set of agents, where each item may be a good (positively valued) for some agents and a bad (negatively valued) for others, i.e., a mixed…
We consider allocating indivisible goods with provable fairness guarantees that are satisfied regardless of which bundle of items each agent receives. Symmetrical allocations of this type are known to exist for divisible resources, such as…
In the budget-feasible allocation problem, a set of items with varied sizes and values are to be allocated to a group of agents. Each agent has a budget constraint on the total size of items she can receive. The goal is to compute a…
Bipartite matching, where agents on one side of a market are matched to agents or items on the other, is a classical problem in computer science and economics, with widespread application in healthcare, education, advertising, and general…