Related papers: Hiding in Plain Sight: Reframing Hardware Trojan B…

Third-party intellectual property cores are essential building blocks of modern system-on-chip and integrated circuit designs. However, these design components usually come from vendors of different trust levels and may contain undocumented…

The global semiconductor supply chain involves design and fabrication at various locations, which leads to multiple security vulnerabilities, e.g., Hardware Trojan (HT) insertion. Although most HTs target digital circuits, HTs can be…

This paper reports a novel approach that uses transistor aging in an integrated circuit (IC) to detect hardware Trojans. When a transistor is aged, it results in delays along several paths of the IC. This increase in delay results in timing…

The globalization of the Integrated Circuit (IC) supply chain has moved most of the design, fabrication, and testing process from a single trusted entity to various untrusted third-party entities worldwide. The risk of using untrusted…

The globalized semiconductor supply chain has made Hardware Trojans (HT) a significant security threat to embedded systems, necessitating the design of efficient and adaptable detection mechanisms. Despite promising machine learning-based…

Despite their success and popularity, deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable when facing backdoor attacks. This impedes their wider adoption, especially in mission critical applications. This paper tackles the problem of Trojan…

The rise of hardware-level security threats, such as side-channel attacks, hardware Trojans, and firmware vulnerabilities, demands advanced detection mechanisms that are more intelligent and adaptive. Traditional methods often fall short in…

The globalization of the semiconductor industry has introduced security challenges to Integrated Circuits (ICs), particularly those related to the threat of Hardware Trojans (HTs) - malicious logic that can be introduced during IC…

Always-on hardware Trojans (HTs) pose a critical risk to trusted microelectronics, yet most side-channel detection methods rely on unavailable golden references. We present a reference-free approach that combines time-frequency EM analysis…

Logic locking and hardware Trojans are two fields in hardware security that have been mostly developed independently from each other. In this paper, we identify the relationship between these two fields. We find that a common structure that…

Recently, Haider et al. introduced the first rigorous hardware Trojan detection algorithm called HaTCh. The foundation of HaTCh is a formal framework of hardware Trojan design, which formally characterizes all the hardware Trojans based on…

Hardware Trojan detection and protection is becoming more crucial as more untrusted third parties manufacture many parts of critical systems nowadays. The most common way to detect hardware Trojans is comparing the untrusted design with a…

Due to the current horizontal business model that promotes increasing reliance on untrusted third-party Intellectual Properties (IPs), CAD tools, and design facilities, hardware Trojan attacks have become a serious threat to the…

Traditional learning-based approaches for run-time Hardware Trojan detection require complex and expensive on-chip data acquisition frameworks and thus incur high area and power overhead. To address these challenges, we propose to leverage…

Always-on hardware Trojans pose a serious challenge to integrated circuit trust, as they remain active during normal operation and are difficult to detect in post-deployment settings without trusted golden references. This paper presents a…

Hardware Trojans have drawn the attention of academia, industry and government agencies. Effective detection mechanisms and countermeasures against such malicious designs can only be developed when there is a deep understanding of how…

Malware detection using Hardware Performance Counters (HPCs) offers a promising, low-overhead approach for monitoring program behavior. However, a fundamental architectural constraint, that only a limited number of hardware events can be…

A massive threat to the modern and complex IC production chain is the use of untrusted off-shore foundries which are able to infringe valuable hardware design IP or to inject hardware Trojans causing severe loss of safety and security.…

Split manufacturing (SM) and layout camouflaging (LC) are two promising techniques to obscure integrated circuits (ICs) from malicious entities during and after manufacturing. While both techniques enable protecting the intellectual…

We propose TrojanSAINT, a graph neural network (GNN)-based hardware Trojan (HT) detection scheme working at the gate level. Unlike prior GNN-based art, TrojanSAINT enables both pre-/post-silicon HT detection. TrojanSAINT leverages a…