Related papers: Oscillatory equilibrium in asymmetric evolutionary…
When a prediction algorithm serves a collection of users, disparities in prediction quality are likely to emerge. If users respond to accurate predictions by increasing engagement, inviting friends, or adopting trends, repeated learning…
Social institutions are systems of shared norms and rules that regulate people's behaviors, often emerging without external enforcement. They provide criteria to distinguish cooperation from defection and establish rules to sustain…
Evolutionary games are a developing sub-field of game theory. This branch of game theory is used in the study of the adaptation of large, but finite, populations of agents to changes in the environment. It assumes that each agent has no…
We report on new stability conditions for evolutionary dynamics in the context of population games. We adhere to the prevailing framework consisting of many agents, grouped into populations, that interact noncooperatively by selecting…
Emerging applications in engineering such as crowd-sourcing and (mis)information propagation involve a large population of heterogeneous users or agents in a complex network who strategically make dynamic decisions. In this work, we…
The dynamical mechanisms that can stabilize the coexistence of species (or strategies) are of substantial interest for the maintenance of biodiversity and in sociobehavioural dynamics. We investigate the mean extinction time in the…
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) in classical game theory is a refinement of Nash equilibrium concept. We investigate the consequences when a small group of mutants using quantum strategies try to invade a classical ESS in a population…
The evolutionary mechanisms of cooperative behavior represent a fundamental topic in complex systems and evolutionary dynamics. Real-world collective interactions, particularly in multi-agent systems, are often characterized by…
Dynamic nonzero sum games are widely used to model multi agent decision making in control, economics, and related fields. Classical methods for computing Nash equilibria, especially in linear quadratic settings, rely on strong structural…
We study repeated games where players use an exponential learning scheme in order to adapt to an ever-changing environment. If the game's payoffs are subject to random perturbations, this scheme leads to a new stochastic version of the…
This paper proposes a co-evolutionary model of directed graphs and three opinions, i.e., conservative$(+)$, neutral$(\odot)$ and liberal$(-)$. Agents update both opinions and social relationships with bias. We find that an emergent game…
We introduce and study a mean-field model for a system of spatially distributed players interacting through an evolutionary game driven by a replicator dynamics. Strategies evolve by a replicator dynamics influenced by the position and the…
Recently, a new model extending the standard replicator equation to a finite set of players connected on an arbitrary graph was developed in evolutionary game dynamics. The players are interpreted as subpopulations of multipopulations…
Feedbacks between strategies and the environment are common in social-ecological, evolutionary-ecological, and even psychological-economic systems. Utilizing common resources is always a dilemma for community members, like tragedy of the…
We use analytical techniques based on an expansion in the inverse system size to study the stochastic evolutionary dynamics of finite populations of players interacting in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game. We show that a mechanism of…
Evolutionary game theory is a mathematical toolkit to analyse the interactions that an individual agent has in a population and how the composition of strategies in this population evolves over time. While it can provide neat solutions to…
Evolutionary game theory has been a successful tool to combine classical game theory with learning-dynamical descriptions in multiagent systems. Provided some symmetric structures of interacting players, many studies have been focused on…
When microbes compete for limited resources, they often engage in chemical warfare using bacterial toxins. This competition can be understood in terms of evolutionary game theory (EGT). We study the predictions of EGT for the bacterial…
Sex is considered as an evolutionary paradox, since its evolutionary advantage does not necessarily overcome the two fold cost of sharing half of one's offspring's genome with another member of the population. Here we demonstrate that…
We show that many definitions of stability found in the learning theory literature are equivalent to one another. We distinguish between two families of definitions of stability: distribution-dependent and distribution-independent Bayesian…