Related papers: Sealed-bid Auctions on Blockchain with Timed Commi…
We study methods to enhance statistical privacy in blockchain transactions. We analyze economic mechanisms for privacy-aware transaction owners whose utility depends not only on the outcome of the mechanism but also negatively on the…
Blockchain systems often employ proof-of-work consensus protocols to validate and add transactions into hashchains. These protocols stimulate competition among miners in solving cryptopuzzles (e.g. SHA-256 hash computation in Bitcoin) in…
Computational task offloading based on edge computing can deal with the performance bottleneck of traditional cloud-based systems for Internet of things (IoT). To further optimize computing efficiency and resource allocation, collaborative…
Demand for blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum is far larger than supply, necessitating a mechanism that selects a subset of transactions to include "on-chain" from the pool of all pending transactions. This paper investigates the…
Blockchains rely on economic incentives to ensure secure and decentralised operation, making incentive compatibility a core design concern. However, protocols are rarely deployed in isolation. Applications interact with the underlying…
Cloud auctions provide cost-effective strategies for cloud VM allocation. Most existing cloud auctions simply assume that the auctioneer is trustable, and thus the fairness of auctions can be easily achieved. However, in fact, such a…
Recent attention on secure multiparty computation and blockchain technology has garnered new interest in developing auction protocols in a decentralized setting. In this paper, we propose a secure and private Vickrey auction protocol that…
We are interested in the problem of optimal commitments in rank-and-bid based auctions, a general class of auctions that include first price and all-pay auctions as special cases. Our main contribution is a novel approach to solve for…
High-frequency trading, in both traditional and decentralized markets, induces latency races and redundant order flow as traders spend resources to win time-sensitive opportunities. We show that auctioning artificial time priority can…
In an electronic auction protocol, the main participants are the seller, a set of trusted auctioneer(s) and the set of bidders. In this paper we consider the situation where there is a seller and a set of n bidders intending to come to an…
Mechanisms for decentralized finance on blockchains suffer from various problems, including suboptimal price execution for users, latency, and a worse user experience compared to their centralized counterparts. Recently, off-chain…
Programmable blockchains have long been a hot research topic given their tremendous use in decentralized applications. Smart contracts, using blockchains as their underlying technology, inherit the desired properties such as verifiability,…
Smart contracts are stateful programs deployed on blockchains; they secure over a trillion dollars in transaction value per year. High-stakes smart contracts often rely on timely alerts about external events, but prior work has not analyzed…
Deterministic auctions are attractive in practice due to their transparency, simplicity, and ease of implementation, motivating a sharper understanding of when they can attain the same outcomes as randomized mechanisms. We study…
In recent years, the blockchain-based Internet of Things (IoT) has been researched and applied widely, where each IoT device can act as a node in the blockchain. However, these lightweight nodes usually do not have enough computing power to…
This paper explores how ad platforms can utilize Bayesian persuasion within blockchain-based auction systems to strategically influence advertiser behavior despite increased transparency. By integrating game-theoretic models with machine…
I study a repeated auction in which payments are made with a blockchain token created and initially owned by the auction designer. Unlike the ``virtual money'' previously examined in mechanism design, such tokens can be saved and traded…
We develop a model of coordination and allocation of decentralized multi-sided markets, in which our theoretical analysis is promisingly optimizing the decentralized transaction packaging process at high-throughput blockchains or Web 3.0…
A feasible, secure and collusion-attack-free quantum sealed-bid auction protocol is proposed using a modified scheme for multi-party circular quantum key agreement. In the proposed protocol, the set of all ($n$) bidders is grouped in to $l$…
Optimistic responsiveness -- the ability of a consensus protocol to operate at the speed of the network -- is widely used in consensus protocol design to optimize latency and throughput. However, blockchain applications incentivize…