Related papers: Strategic Facility Location via Predictions

We address the problem of distributed cooperative localization in wireless networks, i.e. nodes without prior position knowledge (agents) wish to determine their own positions. In non-cooperative approaches, positioning is only based on…

Strategyproof mechanisms provide robust equilibrium with minimal assumptions about knowledge and rationality but can be unachievable in combination with other desirable properties such as budget-balance, stability against deviations by…

As autonomous AI agents increasingly mediate online platform markets, a fundamental question emerges: do these markets generate stable strategic outcomes? In repeated strategic environments, the Nash equilibrium provides a natural benchmark…

In this paper we propose an annealing based framework to incorporate inequality constraints in optimization problems such as facility location, simultaneous facility location with path optimization, and the last mile delivery problem. These…

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires \emph{multiple} agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a…

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) have emerged as a promising technique to rapidly provide wireless services to a group of mobile users simultaneously. The paper aims to address a challenging issue that each user is selfish and may misreport…

We study a sequence of independent one-shot non-cooperative games where agents play equilibria determined by a tunable mechanism. Observing only equilibrium decisions, without parametric or distributional knowledge of utilities, we aim to…

We study the classic facility location setting, where we are given $n$ clients and $m$ possible facility locations in some arbitrary metric space, and want to choose a location to build a facility. The exact same setting also arises in…

We consider the problem of controlling the movement of multiple cooperating agents so as to minimize an uncertainty metric associated with a finite number of targets. In a one-dimensional mission space, we adopt an optimal control framework…

We propose a new scalable algorithm for facility location. Facility location is a classic problem, where the goal is to select a subset of facilities to open, from a set of candidate facilities F , in order to serve a set of clients C. The…

In a single facility location problem, a set of points is given and the goal is finding the optimal location of new facility respect to given criteria such as minimizing time, cost and distances between the clients and facilities. On the…

We present a randomized distributed approximation algorithm for the metric uncapacitated facility location problem. The algorithm is executed on a bipartite graph in the Congest model yielding a (1.861 + epsilon) approximation factor, where…

We study the problem of allocating homogeneous and indivisible objects among agents with money. In particular, we investigate the relationship between egalitarian-equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler, 1978), as a fairness concept, and…

Metric facility location and $K$-means are well-known problems of combinatorial optimization. Both admit a fairly simple heuristic called single-swap, which adds, drops or swaps open facilities until it reaches a local optimum. For both…

This paper studies the performative policy learning problem, where agents adjust their features in response to a released policy to improve their potential outcomes, inducing an endogenous distribution shift. There has been growing interest…

AI systems are increasingly deployed in high-stakes contexts (medical diagnosis, legal research, financial analysis) under the assumption they can be governed by norms. This paper demonstrates that the assumption is formally invalid for…

The facility location problem is a well-known challenge in logistics that is proven to be NP-hard. In this paper we specifically simulate the geographical placement of facilities to provide adequate service to customers. Determining…

We consider a problem where agents have private positions on a line, and public approval preferences over two facilities, and their cost is the maximum distance from their approved facilities. The goal is to decide the facility locations to…

We design online algorithms for the fair allocation of public goods to a set of $N$ agents over a sequence of $T$ rounds and focus on improving their performance using predictions. In the basic model, a public good arrives in each round,…

This paper studies algorithmic decision-making under human's strategic behavior, where a decision maker uses an algorithm to make decisions about human agents, and the latter with information about the algorithm may exert effort…