Related papers: Persuasion with Ambiguous Communication
We consider that a transmitter covertly communicates with multiple receivers under the help of a friendly jammer. The messages intended for different receivers are transmitted in mutually orthogonal frequency bands. An adversary observes…
We study the bounds of mediated communication in sender-receiver games in which the sender's payoff is state-independent. We show that the feasible distributions over the receiver's beliefs under mediation are those that induce zero…
Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should influence beliefs of rational receivers who take decisions through Bayesian updating of a common prior. We focus on the online Bayesian persuasion framework, in which the sender…
The survey is concerned with the issue of information transmission from experts to non-experts. Two main approaches to the use of experts can be traced. According to the game-theoretic approach expertise is a case of asymmetric information…
A persuasion policy successfully persuades an agent to pick a particular action only if the information is designed in a manner that convinces the agent that it is in their best interest to pick that action. Thus, it is natural to ask, what…
An agent may strategically employ a vague message to mislead an audience's belief about the state of the world, but this may cause the agent to feel guilt or negatively impact how the audience perceives the agent. Using a novel experimental…
A network of agents attempt to learn some unknown state of the world drawn by nature from a finite set. Agents observe private signals conditioned on the true state, and form beliefs about the unknown state accordingly. Each agent may face…
In the classical Bayesian persuasion model an informed player and an uninformed one engage in a static interaction. The informed player, the sender, knows the state of nature, while the uninformed one, the receiver, does not. The informed…
This paper studies AI persuasion by distinguishing between two reasons for disagreement: attention differences, where the AI detects features the decision-maker missed, and comprehension differences, where the AI and the decision-maker…
The ability to persuade others is critical to professional and personal success. However, crafting persuasive messages is demanding and poses various challenges. We conducted nine exploratory case studies to identify adaptations that…
We consider general Bayesian persuasion problems where the receiver's utility is single-peaked in a one-dimensional action. We show that a signal that pools at most two states in each realization is always optimal, and that such pairwise…
In open-domain question answering, due to the ambiguity of questions, multiple plausible answers may exist. To provide feasible answers to an ambiguous question, one approach is to directly predict all valid answers, but this can struggle…
How does one test empirically the hypothesis that a decision maker (DM) is being influenced by information via Bayesian persuasion? In this paper, I consider a DM whose state-dependent preferences are known to an analyst, who sees the…
Standard models of multi-agent modal logic do not capture the fact that information is often ambiguous, and may be interpreted in different ways by different agents. We propose a framework that can model this, and consider different…
We consider the classic veto bargaining model but allow the agenda setter to engage in persuasion to convince the veto player to approve her proposal. We fully characterize the optimal proposal and experiment when Vetoer has quadratic loss,…
We propose a new notion of credibility for Bayesian persuasion problems. A disclosure policy is credible if the sender cannot profit from tampering with her messages while keeping the message distribution unchanged. We show that the…
We study the merging and the testing of opinions in the context of a prediction model. In the absence of incentive problems, opinions can be tested and rejected, regardless of whether or not data produces consensus among Bayesian agents. In…
We study games in which a leader makes a single commitment, and then multiple followers (each with a different utility function) respond. In particular, we study ambiguous commitment strategies in these games, in which the leader may commit…
Pervasive personal communication technologies offer the potential for important social benefits for individual users, but also the potential for significant social difficulties and costs. In research on face-to-face social interaction,…
We focus on the scenario in which an agent can exploit his information advantage to manipulate the outcome of an election. In particular, we study district-based elections with two candidates, in which the winner of the election is the…