Related papers: Putting Gale & Shapley to Work: Guaranteeing Stabi…
Two-sided matching platforms provide users with menus of match recommendations. To maximize the number of realized matches between the two sides (referred here as customers and suppliers), the platform must balance the inherent tension…
We introduce a new algorithm for finding stable matchings in multi-sided matching markets. Our setting is motivated by a PhD market of students, advisors, and co-advisors, and can be generalized to supply chain networks viewed as $n$-sided…
Stable matching in a community consisting of $N$ men and $N$ women is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since its introduction in 1962 in a seminal paper by Gale and…
We study a practical centralized matching problem which assigns children to daycare centers. The collective preferences of siblings from the same family introduce complementarities, which can lead to the absence of stable matchings, as…
In the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two well-known models: the marriage model (where no money is involved) and the assignment model (where payments are involved). Roth and Sotomayor (1990) asked for an explanation for the…
We study the stable marriage problem in the partial information setting where the agents, although they have an underlying true strict linear order, are allowed to specify partial orders. Specifically, we focus on the case where the agents…
We develop inference for a two-sided matching model where the characteristics of agents on one side of the market are endogenous due to pre-matching investments. The model can be used to measure the impact of frictions in labour markets…
The stable matching problem sets the economic foundation of several practical applications ranging from school choice and medical residency to ridesharing and refugee placement. It is concerned with finding a matching between two disjoint…
This paper links matching markets with aligned preferences to optimal transport theory. We show that stability, efficiency, and fairness emerge as solutions to a parametric family of optimal transport problems. The parameter reflects…
School choice is the two-sided matching market where students (on one side) are to be matched with schools (on the other side) based on their mutual preferences. The classical algorithm to solve this problem is the celebrated deferred…
We study uncoordinated matching markets with additional local constraints that capture, e.g., restricted information, visibility, or externalities in markets. Each agent is a node in a fixed matching network and strives to be matched to…
Algorithmic stability is a central concept in statistics and learning theory that measures how sensitive an algorithm's output is to small changes in the training data. Stability plays a crucial role in understanding generalization,…
We study two-sided matching markets in which one side of the market (the players) does not have a priori knowledge about its preferences for the other side (the arms) and is required to learn its preferences from experience. Also, we assume…
We propose a notion of concavity in two-sided many-to-one matching, which is an analogue to the balancedness condition in cooperative games. A stable matching exists when the market is concave. We provide a class of concave markets. In the…
We consider the stability of matchings when individuals strategically submit preference information to a publicly known algorithm. Most pure Nash equilibria of the ensuing game yield a matching that is unstable with respect to the…
The literature on centralized matching markets often assumes that a true preference of each player is known to herself and fixed, but empirical evidence casts doubt on its plausibility. To circumvent the problem, we consider evolutionary…
The stable marriage and stable roommates problems have been extensively studied due to their high applicability in various real-world scenarios. However, it might happen that no stable solution exists, or stable solutions do not meet…
In many two-sided labor markets, interviews are conducted before matches are formed. The growing number of interviews in medical residency markets has increased demand for signaling mechanisms, where applicants send a limited number of…
In the fundamental Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates problems, there are inherent trade-offs between the size and stability of solutions. While in the former problem, a stable matching always exists and can be found efficiently using the…
In many empirical studies of a large two-sided matching market (such as in a college admissions problem), the researcher performs statistical inference under the assumption that they observe a random sample from a large matching market. In…